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FRANCIS MARION AND HIS DISTRICT 
The Revolutionary War career of Francis Marion began 
on June 17, 1775. This date marked his election as a 
Captain in the Second South Carolina Regiment by the 
Provisional Congress of South Carolina. The regimental 
c ommander was Colone l William Moultrie, under whom Marion 
had served as a Lieutenant in the Indian Wars of South 
Carolina in 1761. 1 On November 14, 1775 Marion was 
promoted to Major as a result of the formation of a third 
regiment in South Carolina . 2 Marion served with the Second 
South Carolina Regime nt during its successful defense of 
Charleston against the British on June 28, 1776 . 3 After 
1Edward McGrady, History of South Carolina in the 
Revolution (New York: :l\Iacl\Iil lan, 1901), p. 568; Wil liam 
Gilmore Simms, The Life of Francis Marion (New York: 
Derby , 1858), p . 46; and William Moultrie, Memoirs of the 
American Revolution (New York: David Longworth , 1802), 
Vol. II, p. 223. Marion had also s erved in the Indian Wars 
of 1759 as a Private in the Company of his brother, Gabriel 
Marion. 
2Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register of the 
Officers of the Continental Army during the War of the 
Revolution (Washington: Rare Book Shop Publishing Company, 
I nc . , 1914) , p. 379. The cadre for the third regiment 
c ame from the first and second, thereby creating vacancies . 
. 3A. C. M. Azoy, "Palmetto Fort , Palmetto Flag, " 
American Heritage Magazine, Vol. VI, No. 6 (October, 1955), 
p. 63. They were located at Fort Johnson, later called 
Fort Moultrie . 
the battle Moultrie was promoted to General. With this 
p romotion 1\1:trion assumed command of the regiment and on 
September 16, 1776 he was made Lieutenant Colonel 
Commandant in the regular (Continental) service . 4 From 
that time until just before the fall of Charleston on 
May 11, 1780, he commanded various military functions 
between Savannah and Charleston . 5 During the British 
siege of Charleston by General Clinton, April 2 through 
May 11, 1780, Francis Marion broke his ankle and was sent 
out of the city along with the other wounded, thereby 
preventing his capture. 6 
2 
4John Rutledge to the Delegates of the South Carolina 
Congress , December 30, 1780, Lyman C. Draper I\Ianuscript 
Collection, State His tor ical Society of Wisconsin, 1VV8 
(Two sections of the Draper Collection will be used in this 
paper, The Sumter Papers with the code VV and South Carolina 
in the Revolution-Miscellaneous coded as UU. Subsequent 
citations will be noted as Draper Mss, VV or UU, as 
applicable.); Simms, op . cit . , p . 77 ; and Heitman, op. cit., 
p . 379 . This was Marion's highest Continental rankthough 
he was made a Brigadier of the state militia by Governor 
Rutledge in late 1780. 
5General Benjamin Lincoln to Francis Marion, 
January 31, 1780, Frederic R. Kirkland (ed.), Letters on 
the American Revolution (Philadelphia: Privately Printed, 
1941), Vol. I, p. 63. He commanded Fort Moultrie; led 
the Second South Carolina Regiment in the abortive assault 
against Savannah in October 1779; conducted field operations 
with 200 handpicked men in the vicinity of She ldon , South 
Carolina . 
6Moultrie, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 65-104. A journal 
of the siege of Charleston in .Moultrie's Memoirs reflects 
that the enemy actually opened their works on the night of 
April 2,. 1780 . George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin, Rebe ls 
and Redcoats (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1957), 
pp. 395-399. Scheer and Rankin stated the ground was broken 
o n March 31, 1780. The two sources agree that the 
3 
The countryside around Charleston was swarming with 
British soldiers looking for American stragglers which 
forced Marion to move constantly . In his efforts to evade 
the British, Marion depended on his friends to hide him 
but eventually, for his safety and out of patriotism, he 
moved north to get back in action . His movemen ts carried 
him to Hillsborough, North Carolina, where he met Baron 
Johann DeKalb in July 1780 who headed the advance elements 
of a new Southern Army that was to be commanded by General 
Horatio Gates . 7 General Gates arrived in Hillsborough on 
July 27, 1780 and moved his army to South Carolina arriving 
on August 5, 1780. 8 Francis Marion and about twenty of his 
capitulation was agreed to on May 11, 1780. Scheer and 
Rankin inferred the siege began on February 11, 1780 with 
the arrival of British ships off Charleston. However 
Clinton remained idle for eight weeks. Moultrie's date 
as the beg inning of the siege was March 28, the date the 
British crossed the Ashley River in force. P. Horry and 
M. L. Weems, The Life of Gen'l Francis Marion (New York: 
John W. Lovell Company, 1882) and Wi lliam Dobein James, 
A Sketch of the Life of Brig Gen Francis Marion and a 
History of His Brigade from its Rise in June 1780 until 
Disbanded in 1782 (Marietta, Georgia: Continental Book 
Co., 1948 (a reprint of 1821 edition)), p . 30. Weems 
said Marion was visiting in the house of a man who 
wanted to display his hospitality. The host loc ked the 
door to prevent anyone from leaving until all had been 
provided the best time possible. Weems said that Marion 's 
sense of duty caused him to jump from a window to get 
away from the party thereby crushing his ankle . 
7McGrady, op . cit . , p. 533 . 
.. . 8Moul trie, op. c i .t. , Vol. I I, p . 104 , and New Jersey 
Gazette , August 30-,-1780 . The latter contained a quote 
from a letter of an officer in the South Carolina line 
dated August 7, 1780, stating that General Gates had 
arrived in South Carolina two days earlier at the head of a 
men accompanied Gates' Army . 9 On August 10, 1780 General 
Gates, in consultation with Governor John Rutledge, 
detached Marion to command an American militia body of 
about two hundred men in the vicinity of Williamsburg, 
4 
South Carolina, thirty five miles northwest of Georgetown.IO 
It was a propitious matching of a man, a force, a time 
and an area. It was the area of Eastern South Carolina, 
specifically around Georgetown, that eventually gave more 
importance to Marion than he would have otherwise received. 
While l\Iarion commanded t his militia unit, August 
1780 until December 1782, he served under two different 
commanders of the Southern Army, Gates and subsequently 
General Nathanael Greene . General Gates was his commander 
" park of artillery, Col. Arnold's ~rmand' s] Corps, 
a Regiment of Virginia state troops, and a part of South 
Carolina refugees, under Col l\Iarion .... " 
9 s · ··t 106 d Rb t D B S l.IIlJllS, op. c1 • , p. an o er . ass, wamp 
Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion 
(New York: Henry Hol t and Company, 1959 ) , p. 36. The 
account of these twenty was attribu ted to Colonel Otho H. 
Williams, Gates Adjutant at the time, who said they were 
men and boys, black and white but all mounted and miserably 
equipped. 
10navid Ramsay, The History of South Carolina 
(Newberry, South Carolina : W. J. Duff ie, 1858), Vol. I, 
p. 231; New Jersey Gazette, August 30, 1780; Weems, 
op. cit . , p. 103; Simms, op . cit., p. 120; Bass, op. cit., 
pp. 40-41; James, op. cit-:-:- p~6; and Mcgrady, op. cit., 
p. 651 . There is much disagreement as to the exact date. 
Ramsay said 1 or 2 August . This is disputed by New Jersey 
Gazette of August 30, 1780 (see note 8). Weems gave a 
date of August 15, 1780. This would appear impossible 
because of the battle of Camden on the night of 16 August 
1780 and Marion took several days to outfit his band and 
conducted two operations before the 17th of August. Bass 
between August 10 and December 4, 1780. During this 
period Marion employed guerr illa tactics, many of which 
he had learned during his campaigns against the Indians 
5 
in 1759 and 1761. 11 From December 4, 1780 to December 14, 
1782 he served under General Greene. While serving under 
Greene he employed both guerrilla and conventional tactics, 
the latter beg inning after he seized Georgetown on May 28, 
1781. 12 
The two commanders', Gates and Greene, overall 
strategy differed in one important aspect, speed. General 
Gates moved fast, evidently in hopes o_f a speedy and 
decisive victory in the South. He moved so fast that 
his men were virtually starved for weeks before the battle 
of Camden on August 16, 1780. Gates had failed to take 
time to train the new militia under him, obtain cavalry in 
gives a date of August 17, 1780. The same reasoning 
applies here as for Weems. McGrady dates it at August 10, 
1780, James said August 10 or 12, 1780 and Simms did not 
give an exact date . Based on the number of things that 
were accomplished between assumption of command and 
Gates' Battle of Camden, I b e lieve August 10 is the 
most likely. 
llJames, op. cit., p. 15. The most important 
tactic learned and used was the ambush. Marion had been 
caught in an Indian Ambush in 1761 and it made a definite 
impression on him. Marion's first recorded use of the 
ambush was on or about 14 August 1780 in an encounter 
with the tory, Captain Barefield near the Blue Savannah. 
The ambush was successful and became a useful tactical tool . 
. ~2Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 29, 1781, 
Southern History Association Publications, Vol. XI, 
pp. 197-198. 
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sufficient numbers to offset the British cavalry superiority , 
or wait for the receipt of intelligence. 13 General Greene, 
on the other hand, took his time in moving to meet the 
enemy and was careful to prepare himself logistically and 
militarily. 14 
Although the overall strategic concepts of the two 
generals differed, their tactical use of Marion was initially 
the same. Thomas Pinckney, General Gates Aide-de-camp at 
the time, said that Gates and Marion had agreed on Marion's 
mission of providing intelligence and harassing the enemy's 
supply lines before 1Iarion l eft the army to assume command 
o f the Williamsburg militia. 15 This mutual agreement of 
the use of Marion was exemplified by Marion's actions 
after h e left Gates. His orders to Peter Horry reflect 
that Marion must have had intelligence and harassing 
13nic tionary of American Biography (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), Vol. IV, pp . 184-188 . 
. 14George Washington Greene, The Life of Major-
General Nathanael Greene (New York: Hurd and Haughton, 
1871 and 1897), Vol. III, pp. 14-19 and 34-67. Greene 
stopped along the way south at Philadelphia and Richmond 
to obtain troops and supplies . Nathanael Greene to 
Francis Marion, January 16, 1781, Southern History 
Association, Vol. XI, p. 189 and Greene to Marion, 
May 4, 1781, Greene Papers, William L. Clements Library, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan (Hereafter 
abbreviated Greene Papers, Clements Library). Greene 
saw the need for a strong cavalry force and requested 
horses from the Brigadiers, Sumter and Marion, to outfit 
more cavalry . 
15Thomas Pinckney, The Historical Magazine, Draper 
Mss, 1UU74, and G. W. Greene, op. cit. , Vol III, pp. 26-30 . 
missions. 16 Greene's use of Marion was specific and 
clearly documented in correspondence between the two men. 
Although Marion's force was important for harassment and 
· the gathering of intelligence, Greene also made it c l ear 
that "flying parties" such as Marion's were of small 
consequence for the great events of war . 17 After the 
capture of Georgetown i n May 1781 Greene used Marion 
primarily for the defense of Georgetown and as rein-
forcements for his army. Marion was never used as an 
independent force to fight pitched battles. When a 
significan t engagement appeared eminent , attachments 
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were made to Marion's force to assist him. 18 It was 
Greene 's idea that a guerrilla mili tia force should harass 
the enemy's rear and be kept busy because their tours were 
short and they should b e actively engaged while out for 
service. 19 
16Francis Marion to Peter Horry, August 17, 1780, 
R. W. Gibbes, Documentary History of the American 
Revolution (New York: D. Appleton and Co . , 1857), Vol. II, 
p. 11. 
17General Lafayette to Nathanael Greene, November 12, 
1780, and Francis Mar i on to Greene, December 22, 1780, Greene 
Papers, Clements Library . Greene to Mar ion, December 24, 
1780, June 21 and April 10, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, 
pp. 80-81, 100-101 and Vol. II, p. 159. - --
18Henry Lee to Nathanael Greene, Janua ry 23, 1781 , 
Greene Papers , Clements Library, and Greene to Thomas 
Sumter, February 3, 1781, Draper Mss, 7VV196-198. 
19Nathanael Greene to Thomas Sumter, February 3, 1781, 
Draper Mss, 7VV196-198 and Greene to Francis Marion, 
February 10, 1781, Southern History Association, Vol . XI, 
p. 194. 
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Marion's area of responsibility and the duties in 
the area grew as the campaign in the South turned in favor 
of the Americans. By May of 1782 Francis Marion was 
responsible for a mili tary district comprising 9,495 
square miles . 20 The large area of Marion 's responsibilities 
then included the civil dis tricts of Cheraw, Georgetown and 
Charleston, the latter two comprising about eighty five 
per cent of Eastern South Carolina. The importance of 
Marion's area of responsibility was varied. Georgetown, 
which had been in Marion's possess i on since May 1781, was 
the only American port between Wilmington and Charleston . 
By the end of the war the supplies that came through the 
port of Georgetown in support of the Southern Army were 
immense.21 It was in Marion's area that General Greene 
locate d his rest and recuperation headquarters, the High 
Hills of Santee . 22 The district provided extensive 
provisions of rice, cattle and salt. The rice was grown 
in the low areas near the rivers around Georgetown and salt 
20John Matthews to Francis Marion , May 21, 1782, 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . II, p. 178 and Robert Mills , 
Statistics oTsouth Carolina (Charleston: Hurlbut and Lloyd, 
1826), p . 211. See Appendix A, Flip Number 1. 
21Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, July 27, 1782, 
and Colonel R. Lushington to Marion, October 31, 1782, 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. II, pp . 202 and 245. 
22Nathanae l Greene to Ge org e Washington, October 25, 
1781, George Washington Papers (Wash ington : Library of 
Congress, 1961 ) , Reel 81. 
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was produced along the Waccamaw River. 23 The inland areas 
of the district were cattle areas upon which Greene 
depended greatly for his meat supply . 24 
Control of the seacoast, primarily Georgetown, 
provided a more definite communication and transportation 
system because overland transportation was not only slow 
but subject to constant interruption . The Ame rican port 
of Georgetown allowed a speedier and more dependable flow 
of commerce . The rivers radiating out of Georgetown were 
l ike the spokes of a wheel, with the town as the hub . The 
excellent navigation afforde d by these rivers assured 
communication, trade and transportation with most of 
interior South Carolina. Charleston , though in Mar ion's 
District, remained in the hands of the British . As the 
c u ltural and social center of South Carolina it was the 
object of everyone's attention . Since it was in Marion's 
area os responsibility, he was constantly called on to 
provide intelligence about Charleston and prevent trade 
between the British and the surrounding countryside. 25 
23Mills , 
Francis Marion, 
pp . 190-192. 
op. cit., p. 558, and John Rutledge to 
October 16, 1781, Gibbes , ~- cit., Vol. III, 
24Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, December 27, 
1780, Greene Papers, Clements Library ; Greene to .Marion, 
January 7, 1781, Southern History Association, Vol. XI, 
p. 187; Alexander Swinton to Marion, April 28, 1781, 
Greene Papers, Cle ments Library; Greene to Marion, December 17, 
1781, and Marion to Peter Horry, March 8, 1782, op . cit., 
Vol. III, pp. 225 and 266-267. 
25John Matthews to Francis Marion, August 29, 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . II, pp. 215-216 . 
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Althoug h Marion's district was important for the 
reasons mentione d, the area had to be understood ideo-
logically, economically and geograph~cally if its value 
was to be utilize d effectively. The state can be divide d 
into two s ections, up country and l ow country . There were 
portions of both in Marion's District. Cheraw District 
was part of the up country while Georgetown and Char l eston 
compose d most of the low country. The different ideol ogy 
of the two areas . was based, to a great extent , on t he ir 
immigration routes. The majority of the population in 
Cheraw and interior Georgetown Districts e ntered South 
Carolina from Virginia and Pennsy l vania. The greatest 
number of people who settl ed along the seacoast, Georgetown 
and Charleston Districts, had come directly from Europe . 
These individua l s had entered through Charleston and 
revered it as the center of life in South Carolina. 26 
The district proved to be a great provider of 
supplies and prov isions . The economic importance grew as 
the war progressed for several r easons: (a) the port of 
Georgetown e xpanded i ts trade; (b) the Southern portion 
of the state below Charleston had been so ravaged that 
26willi am A. Schaper, "Secti onalism and Representation 
in South Carolina,'' Annual Re o rt of the American Historical 
Association for the Year 1900 Washington: Government 
Printing Off i ce , 1901 ) , Vol. I, pp. 248 and 379 and W. W. 
Sellers, A History of Marion County (Co lumbia, South Carolina: 
R. L. Bryan Company, 1902), pp . 78-80 and Mi lls , op. cit . , 
pp . 512, 622, 629 and 740. -
there were ins ufficient provisions in that area, thus 
placing greater demands on other parts of the state; 
(c) the British in Charl eston were making an effort to 
store provis ions in case they were placed under siege 
and for their eventual departure from the area. 27 The 
low country was typified b y fertile swamplands and a 
dense growth of pine and other timber. This was the 
section which produced a large amount of rice, indigo 
and naval stores . 28 Of these products, rice was the 
most important and plentious . The area contiguous to 
Georgetown , with its numerous rivers, was the primary 
rice producing area in the district. 29 The inter i or 
portion of the low country and all the up country around 
Cheraw wer e cattle r a i sing areas. Other subsistence 
crops were grown there but not i n signif i cant amounts. 
11 
Geographica lly , Mari on 's dis trict was tied together 
by the numerous rivers radiating out of Georgetown. The 
navigability of these r i vers afforded the s ide who controlled 
Georgetown the benefit of communication wi t h a large portion 
27John Matthews to Francis Marion, April 15, 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 164-165. 
28G. W. Greene, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 3. 
29Mills, ;~. ;it. , p. 558. Mills states that the 
Sampit, Waccamawand Santee Rivers were the most productive 
of the river r ice swamps. The best yields per acre for the 
best rice fields was about 2400 pounds of c lean rice. The 
average was about 2000 pounds or three barrels. 
o f interior South Carolina. Most of the people were 
scattered along the fertile river ba~ks . Control of the 
rivers was therefore necessary to unify the district. 
All the rivers which radiated out of George town , 
except the Sampit, were navigable for great distances . 
12 
The Black River, which flowed by Williamsburg, was 
navigabl e for sixty miles. The Great Pedee could be 
travelled for one hundred and twenty miles passing through 
Cheraw, the northern extreme of Marion's district . The 
Lynches and Little Pedee Rivers branched off the Great 
Pedee and both were passable for at l east seventy miles. 
Waccamaw River, which runs parallel to the Atlantic 
coastline, was navigable for its entire length--Georgetown 
to the Cape Fear River in North Carolina. The only other 
major river in .Marion's district which he controlled was 
the Santee. The mouth of the Santee is about fifteen 
miles south of Ge orgetown. This river could be travelled 
to its junction with the Congaree and Wateree Rivers . 
From the junction the latter t wo were navigable to Columbia 
and Camden, respectively . 3 0 
As the area described became more important so did 
Marion's involvement . Marion and his district grew together 
beginning with 1,256 square miles around Williamsburg, 
30Mills, op. cit., pp. 156-160. The Ashley and 
Cooper Rivers, though in .Mar ion 's district, were not 
controlled by Marion since they had their mouths at 
Charleston which the British con t rolled continuously from 
May 1780 until their departure in December 1782. 
13 
South Carolina in August 1780. 31 It was not until December 30, 
1780 that Marion was assigned a definite area of responsi-
bility. At that time Governor Rutledge assigned all the 
regiments east of the Santee, Wateree and Catawba Rivers 
to his unit and announced Marion's promotion to brigadier 
in the state militia . The size of this area was about 8,295 
square miles. The district at that time included an area 
bounded by a line drawn from the confluence of the Congaree 
and Wateree Rive~s to the northeast until it intersected 
Lynches River and included the land east of the Lynches 
and the Santee Rivers to the North Carolina line and 
Atlantic Ocean . 32 
The year 1781 was a year of changing situations in 
the South and Marion's area of responsibility was affected 
by it. After General Greene went south following the 
Battle ,of Guilford Court House the tide began to turn in 
favor of the Americans. The British , under pressure on 
their outposts, pulled their force at Camden into Charleston 
31 simms, op . cit., pp . 156-157 . Marion's area of 
responsibility encircled Williamsburg (now Kingstree) out 
to a radius of about twenty miles, thus 1,256 square miles. 
(A=rr~~ ). See Appendix A, Flip Number 2. 
32 John Rutledge to the De legates ~f the South Carolina 
Cong ress, December 30, 1780, and John Rutledge to Thomas 
Sumter, January [?] , 1781, Draper Mss , 16VV108-109 and 
7VV176-180 . The area defined by this letter was modified 
somewhat when Rutledge allowed the regiment commanded by 
Colonel Marshall, located between Lynches and Wateree 
River to remain under Sumter's control. See Appendix A, 
Flip Number 3 . 
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and prepared to evacuate Georgetown. 33 This redistribution 
of British forces caused Governor Rutledge, in August 1781, 
to add the area between Charleston aud the Santee River to 
Marion's District. The additional area consisted of the 
northern portion of Charleston District. 34 The remainder 
of Charleston District was assigned to the fourth state 
brigadier, General John Barnwell. Though Barnwell was 
in command of the area, it was evident that l\Iarion exercised 
considerable influence with the people and General Barnweli.3 5 
His influence was such that, on the retirement of General 
Barnwell in l\lay 1782, Governor Matthews assigned the 
remainder of Charleston District to l\Iarion's area . 3 6 This 
33colonel Nesbit Balfour to Colonel Cassels ~oth 
Britis~, March 13, 1781, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, p. 37 
and Francis l\Iarion to Nathanael Greene April 23, 1781, 
Southern History Association, Vol. XI, pp. 196-197. The 
pressure consisted of the capture of Forts Watson and l\lotte 
by Marion and Lee in April and May. Lee then went on to 
capture Fort Granby . This severed the British supply line 
between Charleston and Camden . Without Camden and the other 
Forts, Georgetown was of no use. 
34John Rutledge to Francis l\larion, August 13, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 134-135. See Appendix A, 
Flip Number~ 
35Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, July 25, 1781, 
Charleston Yearbook of 1899, Appendix A, pp. 48-50; Edmund 
Hyrne (Commissary of Prisoners) to Francis Marion, August 18, 
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library; Greene to Mar i on, 
August 10, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 125-126; 
Mar.ion to Greene, September 3~781, Southern Historical 
Association, Vol. XI, pp. 198-201; John Barnwell to Francis 
Marion, December 12, 1781, Gibbes, £E· cit., Vol . III, 
pp. 220-221. 
36John Matthews to Francis Marion, May 21, 1782, 
Gib bes, op. cit . , Vol. I I, p. 178. Governor Matthews had 
been elected Governor at the General Assembl y meeting in 
January 1782 . See Appendix A, Flip Number 1. 
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increased his area of responsibility to the largest point 
ever, 9,495 square miles. 37 
Though Marion's duties had begun as purely military 
in August 1780, they became, by the middle of 1781, more 
varied. As the district grew Marion's responsibilities 
increased in number and in scope. His participation in 
purely military matters diminished to those of defense, 
while those of an administrative nature, logistics and 
local government, grew increasing ly more important and 
time consuming . It is his overall successful accomplishment 
of the latter responsibilities that Marion owes the largest 
share of his fame , thoug h it has received the l east acclaim . 
37Mills, op. cit ., p. 211. 
CHAPTER II 
THE UNGLAMOROUS RESPONSIBILITY OF RECRUITING 
Franc is Marion required a body of men to effect his 
missions and this r equirement increased with the enlargement 
of the area of r espons ibility . The initial need for men 
was small since they were used to gather intelligence and 
harass the enemy . However his responsibility grew to the 
point that by May 1782 he needed men to enforce pol i tical 
directives, procure supplies, control trade, patrol the 
district, and defend Georgetown and other supply points. 
Many authors have simply mentioned :Marion's force as 
Marion's men or Mar i on ' s brigade. They have refrained 
from mention of individuals except i n i solated instances . 
This seems to be a wise decision because it would appear 
that most every male in the distric t served with Francis 
Marion at one time or another. Many of the men changed 
sides, some more than once. 38 An effort will b e made to 
examine the general categories of all the forces which 
served u n der Marion and to consider the specific direct ives 
for recruitment of militia forces . I f it took a force to 
control Marion 's extensive district, it took an even more 
38McGrady, op. c i t . , pp . 300-303. 
17 
skillful manager and administrator to recruit and control 
the controlling forces. 
The soldiers which served in Francis Marion's 
district could be generally and simply classified as two 
types, Continental and Militi~ but that would be an over-
simplification. The troops of the Continental Line could 
and should be further classed. There were three types of 
Continental soldiers in Marion's district . The first of 
these which operated under Marion was not an organized 
unit but stragglers and former members of the Continental 
establishment whose units were no longer intact. Marion 
was one of the stragglers, having just missed capture at 
Charleston because of an injury.39 Peter Horry had been 
sent out of Char leston as a supernumerary officer and had 
joined General Gates force with Marion in July of 1780. 40 
Some of the Continental soldiers had escaped from the 
British or had been on furlough when their units fell to 
the British. A few of these desired to join other units 
in Marion's district . This was normally allowed until 
39James, op . cit., p. 30. 
40Nathanael Greene to Peter Horry~ March 29, 1782, 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 281- 283. Supernumerary 
officerswerethose officers r eleased during a r eduction 
in force. These officers were normally those who held a 
rank which entitled them to a position for which there 
were no vacancies, therefore they were released from 
active duty . Most of the officers placed in this status 
had been so classified just prior to the fall o f Charleston 
in May 1780. 
their old units were reformed, a~ which time they wou ld 
be recalled. 41 These Continentals were, however, a very 
small part of Marion's force and were so poorly c l othed 
they were almost usel ess.42 
18 
The second type Continental soldier was by far the 
most effective, but their presence in the district fluctuated 
with the overall situation in the Southern Theater. This 
force was the organize d unit of Continentals. The best 
example of this type force was the legion c avalry of 
Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee. His cavalry served 
frequentl y and effectively with Mario~. 43 The effectiveness 
of Lee was due , to a great degree, to his mobility which 
blended well with the mobility of Marion's force. Francis 
41
Francis Marion to Peter Horry, Se ptember 17, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. c i t . , Vol. III, p. 168. This letter cited the 
specificcaseof William J ohnson. He had been a soldier 
in the Second South Carolina Reg iment and Peter Horry 
intended to recruit him into his new cavalry corps. 
42Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene , January 1, 
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library. In this letter 
Marion stated that he needed at l east one dozen suits of 
clothing to outfit the Continentals with him . 
43Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, April 23 and 
May 11, 1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library, and G. W. 
Greene, op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 133, 134, 233 and 280. 
Henry Leearr ived at Greene's camp on January 12, 1781 
and was sent to join Marion on January 13, 1781. They 
were to work together against Georgetown. Lee was ordered 
to join General Mor gan about the e nd of January 1781. He 
rejoined Marion April 14, 1781 to invest Fort Watson . 
Lee had been authorized in a letter, Greene to Lee, 
April 4, 1781, G. · W. Greene, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 233, 
to do as he thoug ht best. LeeleftMarion again on May 13, 
1781. He went west to Fort Granby. Marion remained in 
his district. 
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Mari6n asked General Greene for this kind of force as 
early as December 1780. Marion thoug ht that with a few 
Continentals he could be much more effective in preventing 
the British from foraging and obtaining provisions. 44 That 
request could not be fulfilled by Greene at that time 
because he had only 640 Continentals and 450 militia in 
his army at Cheraw, South Carolina . 45 But as soon as Lee 
and his cavalry arrived in the South, J anuary 1781, they 
were dispatched to ass i st Mar ion in attacking Geor getown. 
The attack on Georgetown in January 1781 was not 
completely successful in that Marion and Lee did not take 
and occupy the fort. They did however surprise the garrison 
and would have been successful had they had artillery or 
if the guides had not become lost. 46 The transitory nature 
of this type unit is best exemplified by the fact that Lee 
and this corps of cavalry de parted Marion and went north in 
Greene's retreat late in January of 1781. Lee was again 
4 4Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, December 22, 
1780, Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
45Theodore Thaye r, Nathanael Greene: Strateg i st of 
the American Revolution (New York: 'I\vayne Publications, 1960), 
p. 299. 
46Henry Lee to Nathanael Greene , January 25, 1781, 
and Francis Marion to Greene , January 27, 1781, Greene 
Papers, Clements Library . There was a difference in the 
comments of Marion and Lee concerning the reason that 
success was not complete at Georgetown . Le~ attributed 
the failure to the guides becomi ng los t in the night and 
Marion said it was because the force did not have artillery . 
In his memoirs, Lee softened this and is much l ess critical 
of this action at Georgetown . 
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attached to General Marion in April and May 1781 during the 
siege of Fort Watson and Fort Motte. 47 Soon after the 
capitulation of Fort :Motte , Lee was detached from Marion . 
This detachment left Marion with a militia force of onl y 
about eighty men .48 
The last of the Continental units that served in 
Marion's district was an enigma . This group was generally 
composed of soldiers who had enlisted for one year, most 
of them being natives of Marion's district . They were 
strictly cavalry. The first such unit formed was recruited 
by Lieutenant Colonel Hezekiah l\Iaham . 49 He had served 
u nder Francis l\Iar ion for some time and had distinguished 
himself at Fort Watson . He was an ingen i ous officer and 
had proposed that a tower be buil t during the siege of 
the fort . He made his sugges tion at a time when any hope 
of an American victory at the fort had vanished. The tower 
was buil t of logs and rose to a height above the fort 
thereby enabling riflemen to fire down in the fort . The 
tactic was successful and became commonly known as "Maham's 
Tower." It was use d several times after this.50 The second 
47Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, April 23 and 
May 11, 1781 , Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
48s · ·t 1mms, op . ~. , p. 233. 
49Governor John Mathews to Francis Marion , August 14, 
1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. II, p. 207. 
50Francis :Marion to Nathanael Gre_ene, April 23, 
-1781, Greene Papers, Clemen ts Library . 
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unit of this type was one recruited by Lieutenant Colonel 
Peter Horry. 51 He was the same Peter Horry who had served 
with Marion since Marion assumed comruand in August 1780.52 
Marion assisted both Maham and Horry in their 
recruitment efforts by providing money and p ersonal backing . 53 
Even though he helped these fellow officers whom he had 
known for so long , they became a constant thorn in his side. 
Their recruiting tactics consisted of promising more monthly 
pay than that gi~en to the other Continental cavalry. This 
of course hurt the morale of the cavalry under Greene. 54 
Horry impressed horses illegally for the use of his cavalry . 
This caused Governor Mathews to write Marion to get the 
matter straightened out . It also caused Mathews to take 
away the previous authority of impressment of horses from 
51John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 10, 1781 
and Peter Horry to Nathanael Greene, October 31, 1781, 
Gibbes , op . cit . , Vol. III, pp . 185-188 and 204-205 . 
Rutledge's letter of October 10 said that he did not 
consider Horry or his regiment on the Continental service 
as yet. In Horry's l etter to Greene, October 31, he 
asked Greene his exact status. Evidently Greene considered 
him as part of the Continental line because he allowed him 
to operate independentl y . 
52Peter Horry to Nathanael Greene, June 28, and Jul y 13, 
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library . 
53Peter Horry to Nathanael Greene·, June 28, 1781, 
Greene Papers , Clements Library. 
54Nathanael Greene to Peter Horry, February 1 and 14, 
1782, Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 247-251. Greene 
inferred that their pay was $25.00 per month which was more 
than his cavalry. Greene stated that he hoped the amount 
over the regular pay was in the form of land bounties . 
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all people, to include Marion . 55 But the biggest drawback 
of these two units was their independent activity. Although 
General Marion had helped them recruit , they would not turn 
out to assist him in the district. When their assistance 
was requested they would either refuse on the grounds 
that they obeyed only General Greene's orders, or they 
would furnish a token force, poor ly armed and provisioned . 56 
Their mere presence thwarted British forays into Marion's 
district but that same presence was more trouble than 
assistance for Marion. 57 
It is odd that the very troops which were often 
accused of inefficiency , incompetency and lack of staying 
power were the very f orces which formed the backbone of 
Francis Marion's District. The troops r eferred to are 
the militia . One should not suppose however . that the 
militia under Francis Marion were free from such accusations. 
Their leader was often upset over their discipline, desire, 
patriotism and ability. When Marion furnished a report of 
his strength to General Gates in November of 1780, he 
55John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 10, 1782, 
Gibbes, op . cit ., Vol. III, pp. 157-158. When it was 
decided to raise the two c·orps of cavalry under Maham and 
Horry, the Governor granted them the authority to impress 
(take from the people) horses to mount the cavalry. 
56Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, August 18 and 
20; 1781; and Greene to Mar ion, August 2, 1781, Greene Pape rs, 
Clements Library.· 
57Francis Marion to Peter Horry, September 23, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 171-172. 
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cautioned General Gates not to become overly happy with 
the turn out because he seldom had the same men a fortnight. 
He did not expect this to change until the "Grand Army 
is on the Banks of Santee. 1158 Marion was unhappy with 
the going and coming of the militia, even stating that 
the militia and their i nstability were the r eal causes of 
his desire to resign in May 1781. The militia exasperated 
Marion because they frequently left "at the very point of 
executing a plan," and they continually left him at the 
most critical times.59 
Just as the militia turn out for service fluctuated, 
so did the impressions of their commande rs. Marion's men 
never failed in any set confrontation with the enemy . 
They were never accused of retreating i n anything but an 
orde rly manner. Theirs was frequently an orderly retreat 
but never a disorderly rout. General Greene was generally 
pleased with the performance of the mil i tia under Generals 
Sumter, Marion and Clarke. He wrote Alexander Hamilton on 
that poin t saying that the militia unde r them were "bold 
and daring; the rest of the militia are better cal culated 
to destroy provisions than oppose the enimy [sic] , 11 60 On 
58Francis Marion to Horatio Gates, November 22, 1780, 
Greene Papers, Clements Library . 
59Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 11, 1781, 
Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
60Nathanae l Greene to Alexander Hamilton, J anuary 10, 
-1781, Harold C. Syrett (ed . ), The Papers of Alexander 
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some occasions Marion was optimistic of good turn outs of 
the militia. Just nine days after he had threatened to 
resign because he could not count on the militia, he 
reflected such optimism. He said that though most of the 
militia had gone home, he expected a big return in a few 
d ays which would make him stronger than he had ever been. 61 
At times General Greene was so upset over the small number 
of men and the inabili ty to recruit Continental troops 
that he entertained the idea of recruiting Negro soldiers. 62 
The laws and regulations governing militia duty were 
varied and involved . The militia law in effect when Marion 
assumed command had been passed on February 13, 1779. 63 
Although an effort was made to follow and enforce that 
law, it was seriously outdated. It must be remembered that 
when the law of 1779 was passed, the American Army controlled 
almost all of South Carolina. After the fall of Charleston 
Hamilton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 
Vol. II, p . 530, Greene to Francis Marion , April 24, 1781, 
Greene Papers, Clements Library, and Greene to Marion, 
August 31, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. II, p. 217. In 
the latter letter Greene said he was happy to hear of the 
bravery and firmness of the militia under Marion and wished 
it was the same in every part of the state. 
61Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 20, 1781, 
Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
62Nathanae l Greene to George Washington, March 9, 
1782, George Washington Papers, op. cit., Reel 83. 
63John Rutledge to Francis Mar i on, September 26, 




in May, 1780, and with the British assumption of control, 
this law was worth little more than the paper on which it 
was written. As General Greene's army gained strength and 
controlled more of the formerly British occupied territory , 
the need arose for more applicable militia laws. 
Governor John Rutledge personally initiated most of 
the needed laws. He had been given great powers just 
prior to the fall of Charleston which some people have 
called dic tatorial . 64 But to think that Governor Rutledge 
singularly and summarily changed all the militia laws 
would be an incorrect assumption. He solicited the ideas 
and opinions of Generals Greene, Marion, Sumter and others 
who wer e knowledgeable and avail able . 65 This was an 
emergency and Rutledge rose to the occasion . Rutledge 
did not desire to run the recruitment effort in such a 
catchall fashion. He wanted a stable state and desired 
good civil government. 66 
. 6 ~Margaret Burnham Madlillan, The War Governors in 
the American Revolution (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1943), p. 231. 
65 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 15, 
1781, Gibbe s, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 162-163. In this 
letter Rutledgeasked Marion's ideas on the feasibility of 
granting a pardon for previous British sympathizers to 
come over. He asked several specific questions about how 
Marion thought the present patriots would react to such a 
proc lamation. 
66John Rutledge to 
September 2 and 14, 1781, 
pp. 126-127 and 159-160. 
Justices of the Pe ace for 
military distr ict. 
Francis Marion, August 13, 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, 
Rutledgeasked Marion to appoint 
all the civil districts in his 
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Militia recruitment was not going we l l in mid- 1781 . 
The fall of the British posts between Charleston and Camden 
h a d lulled t~e people into a false sense of security and 
the people in Marion's district wer e no different. They 
would t u rn out readily to defend their homes bu t not 
someone elses. General Thomas Sumter 's fie l d officer 
ranks had been greatly depleted . He laid the blame for 
this on the field officers who had "imprudently g one upon 
private and disgraceful business . " If the field grade 
officers were so "imprudent ," it would seem only normal 
that the privates would be as or more imprudent. Sumter 
had found i t h ard to r ecru it and asked Greene for 
assistance . 67 
Governor Rut l edge normally remained with or very 
near Gen e ral Greene's headquarters to insure quick 
c oordination. However Rutledge was in Philadelphia 
during the summer of 1781 (l\lay, June and July), thus 
slowing down reaction time . When he returned h e took 
positive action to realign the militia to make sure that 
an adequate force was in the field at all times . The 
previous call out system of the militia had consisted of 
irregularly calling up companies and regiments . The 
draft to report for duty occurred as the result of both 
real and imagined emergencies . There had been no set 
67Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene , April 7, 1781, 
Draper Mss, 7VV232-236. 
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system of time of service established by t he law of 1779 . 
When the law was enacted in 1779 the militia wer e to b e 
called up as needed. In 1781 a force was necessary on a 
more permanent basis but it was c l ear that all the men 
could not serve continuously. 
Governor Rutledge's first directive to insure a 
standing force was in the form of l etters to his br i gadi ers, 
Sumter and Marion . I t was issued on September 2, 1781. 
The militia r egiments were to be divided into two equa l 
parts. Each divis ion would serv e one month on duty and 
one month at home. This splitting of units was to go down 
to the c ompany level. I n Rut l e dge's l etter one could 
clearly see the dictatorial powers of the Governor. He 
cons idered anyone who failed to turn out for mil itia duty 
as being the enemy of the state. I n that case, the b rigadier 
was to s end the offender into the British lines and take 
all his property for the use of the state. He further 
stated that all men who had been paroled by t h e British 
without the faith of an officer were considered as liberated. 68 
The liberat i on from p aroles set the stage to deny men the 
opportunity to shirk militia duty based solely on their 
contention of be ing on Br{tish parole.69 
6.8John Ru t l edge to Francis Marion , September 2, 1781, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p. 131. The faith of an officer 
here infers that .the parole was signed by an officer and the 
officer guaranteed the stipulat i ons of the parole, i. e ., 
the British would not viol ate the ir part of the agreement. 
69John Rutledge to Francis Marion , October 5, 1781, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 178-180. 
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The directive concerning militia service of 
September 2, 1781 was modified and expanded by the Governor 
on September 26 of the same year. At that time he directed 
that the militia be divided into three classes (divisions) 
rather than the previous two. The time of service was to 
be for two months on duty and four months off duty for 
each of the divisions. This system would cut down lost 
time on duty as the militia considered their tours as 
running from the time they lef t home un ti l they returned. 
This time of service applied only for military use in 
areas more distant than e i ghty miles ~rom their homes. 
If there was an enemy threat within e i ghty miles of their 
home they could and would be called out more often for as 
long as necessary. In that l etter the Governor specified 
a fine for failure to do militia duty. The fine was not 
to exceed one hundred and fifty pounds specie plus three 
times the amount of tax the offender paid before the militia 
law of February 1779. He also prohibited the use of 
substitutions in the future. 70 
The prohibition of subst i t ution had a significant 
effect on recruitment in Francis Marion's district. It 
70John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 26, 1781, 
and Rutledge to Peter Horry, October 22, 1781, Gibbes, op . 
cit., Vol. III, pp . 173-175 and 194-195. Rutledge to Thomas 
Sumter, October 28, 1781, Draper Mss, 7VV512-513 . It was 
in Rutledge's letter of September 26 that he discussed 
inflation which had hi t the state and he equated 150 pounds 
of specie to 500 pounds of c urrent money. The previous 
ratio had been equal. 
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also posed an enforcement problem for Marion. Peter Horry 
was quite concerned about the stopping of substitution . 
He believed it .would bring his recruiting effort to an end 
because substitutions were his greatest source of manpower . 
Horry also cited Rutledge's directive of requiring him to 
enl ist men for a term of three years rather than ten months 
or a year as a major deterrent to recruitment.71 Governor 
Rutledge did honor the previous substitutions and granted 
exemption from militia duty to those who had hired 
s ubstitutes . 72 
Perhaps Governor Rutledge 's major decision was the 
issuance of his proclamation of pardon on September 27, 
1781. In this proclamation he encouraged people to return 
to the Colonial side. They were given a period of thirty 
days to present themselves before one of the brigadiers 
of the state and petition for acceptance . The responsibility 
for enforcement fell to the brigadiers and caused a great 
deal of unglamorous work . The administrative burden was 
magnified by the research required. Each individual 
applying for pardon had to be checked to determine whether 
he fell in one of the exception categories. The proclamation 
opened the American doors to all individuals except those 
71Peter Horry to John Rutledge, October 30, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 200-203 . 
7~John Rutledge to Peter Horry, October 22, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp . 194-195 . 
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who could be c lassed in one of the fol lowing five categori es: 
1 ) Those who had gone over to the enemy and had not answered 
the pardon ~roclamations i ssued by Governor Rutledge on 
t wo previous occasions to turn themselves in to a Magistrate 
within forty days; 2) Those who had signed congratulatory 
addresses to Admiral Arbuthnot and General Clinton on 
June 5, 1780 or to General Cornwallis on September 19, 
1780; 3) Those individuals who held civil or military 
commissions in the British Government; 4) Those p eople 
whose infamous conduct did not entitle them to the rights 
and privileges of Americans; 5) And to those who had 
r efused to take an oath of allegiance before the fall of 
Charleston in May 1780. 
It is simple to see that the brigadiers were 
saddled with a tremendous administrat i ve burden as a 
r esult of this proclamation. They were to be the approving 
authority for all pardon applicants. I f the brigadier 
petitioned refused to allow the pardon to anyone, he was 
to insure the safe conduct of the applicant back to the 
British lines . The pardon did not come free. The men 
who accepted the pardons were required to serve six months 
continuous duty with the militia beginning at the time of 
the ir surrender. They were to subsequently serve in the 
same manner as all others, two months duty and four months 
at home. I f any of them deserted, their families would 
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be sent away immediately into the British lines and never 
allowed to return. 73 
Governor Rutledge viewed the proclamation as having 
several significant effects. It assisted in American 
recruitment efforts. It denied use of those individuals 
to the British. Lastly, it afforded a person the opportunity 
to return to his home rather than serve a life in exile. 74 
The proof of the effectiveness of former Loyalists as 
American soldiers was g iven by Thomas Sumter. He had 
found that they were quite useful and did their duties 
well, provide d they were treated as pe_ople in the American 
service ought to be. By January 1782, Sumter had "upwards 
of one hundred of these men" serving in his brigade . 75 
Governor Rutledge had thus spent all September 1781 
issuing directives to assist and enforce militia recruitment. 
He spent most of Octobe r 1781 clarifying his instructions. 
The Governor then turned his efforts toward the establishment 
of a General Assembly to pass laws to return the state to 
civil control and assist the military effort. 76 The desired 
73Proclamation by Governor Rutledge , September 27, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 175-178. 
74John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 15, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 162-163 . 
75Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, . January 2, 
1782, Charleston Yearbook of 1899, App. A, pp . 68- 69 . 
76John Rutledge to Francis Marion, November 23, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 214-215 . Marion was directed 
to conduct elections for an assembly to b e he ld about the 
first of the year (1782 ) . 
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assembly did not convene until January 8, 1782 at 
J acksonborough, South Carolina . 77 When the assembly 
met , several laws were passed in an Bffort to improve 
t he mil itia of the state and raise a Continental force . 
They were overshadowed however by the Confiscation Act. 7 8 
Even the Confiscation Act was designed to assist the state 
militarily to provide money and land for equipment and 
recruitment bounties. 79 
The most ~mportant of the acts passed for the control 
o f the mi l itia was number 1267. Its purpose was to insure 
that a l l men between the ages of sixteen and fifty years 
performed duty. Each Captain in a company district was 
required to take the names of all the men in the district 
every two months. This list was passed up the line until 
i t got to the Governor. The list could be used to verify 
which soldiers were in the Continental line. All those 
not in the Continental line were required to be in the 
mi l itia. Any man found in a company district could and 
would be made to serve in that unit unless he had a 
certificate of service as proof that he was in another 
77Moultrie, op . cit., Vol. II, p . - 305 . 
78General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 
Laws Enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South 
Carolina, January 8 to February 25, 1782 (Philadelphia: 
1782) . 
7~Francis Marion to Peter Horry, February 10, 1782, 
Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III, p. 249 and Moultrie, op . cit . , 
Vol. II,pp.~1-327 . 
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uni~. The Governor had authority to replace officers who 
resigned or were killed. The rank of full Colonel was 
replaced by that of Lieutenant Colonel Commandant. No 
one was to be appointed to the rank of full Colonel after 
the date of the act. 
The service and call up system of the militia was 
greatly altered and showed significant thought. The 
militia draft was to consist of one-fourth of each unit . 
Service was seasonal. During the months of April, May , 
June and July the tour of duty was only one month for each 
one-fourth of the militia. This allowed minimum abse nce 
from home by the citizen soldiers during their critical 
farming times. During the other eight months of the year 
the tour was to be two months for each one-fourth of the 
militia. These tours were for duty against threats in 
excess of eighty miles from their homes . All the militia 
of an area could be called at any time for any length if 
the threat was within eighty miles of their home. The 
regular tours allowed for replacement of reliefs and 
authorized the officers to retain them for an additional 
ten days to insure the next relief had arrived . 
This new act was viry spec ific . If a man reported 
late or with the improper uniform and equipment, he could 
be required to perform double duty. Section six of the 
act prescribed of·fenses and maximum punishments. The 
punishment for the most serious offenses was service in 
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the Continental line . The lesser offenses were punishable 
by additional service with · the militia. This law also laid 
down court-martial requirements and direct ives which were 
helpful in discipline bu t t ime consuming for the militia 
leaders. 
The various company and regimental militia commanders 
were responsible for the local security in their home 
districts. This act required them to form six man patrols 
to enforce laws and k eep the peace. This duty was not 
considered as part of the regular militia duty . The act 
further ruled on substitution and impressment of military 
stores. These two issues had previously been problem areas 
for Governor Rutledge and the b rigadiers. Impressment of 
provisions, forage , horses , wagons , boats and other 
necessities was authorized . The impressor was directe d 
to provide a receipt for any items taken and the receipt 
was to be accompanied by appraisals of the fair value of 
the property by three free holders . This was an attempt 
to cut down on and regulate plundering. 
The ruling on substitutes was clarified. Those 
men who had hired substitutes for the independent cavalry 
corps like Maham's and Horry's were still exempt. These 
exemptions were altered by the new act. The exemptions 
were in force until their substitutes enlistment expired. 
At that time the men who had hired substitutes were 
required to enter the militia service. The act did 
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require those exempted individuals to assist in local 
patrol duty on a regular basis like everyone else. 80 
John Mathews was e l ected Governor during the 
meeting of the legislature in February 1782 thereby placing 
the r esponsibi lity for enforcement and interpretation of 
the new militia law on him. He did not enjoy the same 
degree of authority as had Rutledge but he did have a new 
and viable militia law. He also had sufficient power to 
make interpretations and issue directives with regard to 
his interpretations. The assembly had assisted Mathews 
by passing anothe r act to provide for better def e nse and 
s ecurity while the assembly was not in session. 81 Mathews 
did however make some changes with regard to the tours of 
duty, directing a return to the two months service in the 
militia and four months at home . 8 2 
Governor Mathews also decided on the method of 
handling people who came in from the enemy lines. They 
80General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 
1782, op. cit . Such a policy of placing serious offenders 
in theContinental Army surely did not strengthen the Army 
and probably accounted for many desertion cases . The 
militia, with the l esser offenders was not muc h better. 
However, the need for men and the requirement for some 
sort of punishment allowed little, if a~y, alternative. 
81ibid. 
82John Mathews to Francis Marion, March 3, 1782, 
Gibbes, op. c it., Vol. III, pp. 261-262. The militia law 
of 1782 had stipulated that during the primary months of 
planting the militia force was to be divided in four equal 
groups and serve one month duty and three months at home. 
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were to appear before the Governor or one of the brigadiers 
to determine whether they should b e allowed to come over 
to the American side. I f found worthy, they could either 
post two good and sufficient sureties as proof of their 
intentions to act in good faith . I f this was not possible 
they would b e allowed to find two substitutes to serve in 
the South Carolina Continental forces. I f the substitutes 
could not be found in a reasonable time, the individual 
was required to perform six months constant duty with his 
respective brigade. 83 I t is clear that substitution was 
o nce again approved by the state . Gove rnor Mathews was 
explicit in his directive concerning the matter of 
substitutes . If an individual des ired to be exemp t from 
militia duty and he was under fifty years of a ge he had 
to provide two substitutes but if he was over fifty he 
had to find only one substitute .84 
The militia organization, regardless of the number 
of laws and directives published was, in the words of 
General Greene, "loose and irregular." He had found the 
turn out of the militia forces to be both embarrassing 
83John Mathews to Francis Marionr March 18, 
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p. 276. 
84John Mathews to Francis Marion , September 13, 
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp . 226-227. By this 
time the evacuation of Charleston was c lose at hand. 
The British intentions had been made public in mid-
August 1782. 
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and alarming . 85 He could not under stand why the people 
d id not wan~ to help wi th the war effort . 86 The enforcement 
of the militia laws , whi ch fell on the shoulders of the 
General s , Sumter, Marion and Picke ns, was admittedly 
d ifficult and time consuming. But they were to use their 
own best judgmen t in ruling in each individual case.87 
It would b e a gross understatement to say that the 
turn out of militia f luctuated. After reporting for duty, 
the ir tenure remained constantl y in doubt . Many different 
factors affected t he recruitment and retention of the 
militia. Since the economy was predominantly agricultural, 
they were greatl y interested in be ing home dur i ng the 
plant ing season . 88 As fam ily men, whi ch most were, they 
were constant l y concerned for the safety of their wives 
and children . 89 Many of the me n, particularly those 
around Georgetown and Char l eston, had l arge estates and 
a number of slaves. They were therefore concerned about 
the situation at their homes and whether their slaves had 
85Nathanae l Greene to George Washing t on , February 28, 
1781, George Washington Papers,.££· cit . , Ree l 7 5. 
8~Nathanae l Greene to Francis Marion, June 25, 1781, 
Gibbes , op . cit . , Vo l . III, pp . 100-101 . 
87John Rutledge to Franc i s Marion , October 16 , 1781, 
Gibbes , op . cit., Vol . III, pp. 190-192. 
88simms , pp. 241-245 . 
89Francis Marion to Horat io Gates, October 4, 1780, 
Draper Mss, 7VV67-69. 
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run away or b een carried off. With these concerns on their 
minds, many vacillated between allegiance to British and 
American causes . 90 There were some who turned out to 
fight Loyalists simply because of their intense hatred 
for them . 
As the war slowed down in 1782, it b ecame more 
difficult to get the militia out for service . The danger 
was not eminent and they could see no reason to search 
for the enemy. 91 Many of the most staunch supporters 
were discouraged over the open-armed acceptance of their 
former enemies. The people of Cheraw District under 
Colonel Lamb Benton were particularly unhappy with the 
treaty General Mar ion had signed with the Loyalists on Little 
Pe dee River under .Maj or l\Iicaj ah Ganey in June of 1781. 
The treaty, as we shall see later, made considerable 
concessions to the Loyalists and r equired them to serve in 
the militia. But Colonel Benton and his people were 
appalled that although they had been repeatedly plundered 
by the Loyalists under Ganey they still provided their 
militia quota to Marion's brigade. Now the Loyalists were 
their equals. This caused considerable distress and the 
90colonel Lord Rawdon ~ri tishj to Sir Henry 
Clinton, June 6, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol. III, 
pp. 90-91 and Thayer, op. cit. ,pp. 403-404. 
91John Mathews to Francis Marion, September 18, 
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 228. 
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Cheraw Regiment withheld many of their men on the pretense 
of l ocal def.ense. 92 
Once the militia had reported, there was little or 
no guarantee they would remain . 93 The retent ion of the 
forces was also effected b y many factors. It has been 
pointed out previously that the men under Marion never 
ran from a fi ght. They were not however always anxious 
to chase the enemy too far from home just to fight him. 
They wanted to defend their homes bu t not someone else's. 94 
On many occasions there was no money with which to pay the 
militia or the Contine ntals. 95 When General Greene 
directed Marion to provide him with horses , many of the 
militia left . They knew the irs were the only horses 
available and they did not wan t to g ive them up. 96 The 
92colonel Lamb Ben ton to John Mathews , August 20, 
1782, and Articles of Agreement between Colonel Peter Horry, 
in behalf of General Marion, and Major Ganey, June 17, 1781 , 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 98-99 and 128. 
93Francis Marion to Peter Horry, September 14, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . III, pp . 160-161 and Marion to Horatio 
Gates, November 22, 1780, Greene Papers , Clements Library . 
94Francis Marion to Thomas Sumter, June 23, 1781, 
Draper Mss, 7VV381 and Sumter to Nathanael Greene, July 17, 
1781, Charlestown Yearbook of 1899, App. A, pp. 41 - 43 . 
This situation occurred enroute to fight Colone l Coates at 
Bigg in Church . 
95Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 20, 1782 , and 
John Mathews to Marion, September 13, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit., 
Vol. II, pp. 175 and 226-227 . Money from substituteswa~ 
to be used for Continental recruiting and not for militia pay. 
96simms, op. cit . , pp. 241-245. 
militia were tired of false promises and needed some 
positive signs of good intentions by the government. 
They did not think they had been treated properly. They 
were constantly confronted by criticism and very little 
by appreciation. 97 The final reason many of the militia 
troops left was simple--they just did not want to remain 
in the field for more than one month at a time. 98 
The methods of recruitment were similar to those 
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of all times . The British accused the Americans of brutal 
punishment, threats, and intimidations to get the former 
British subjects to come over the American side. 99 There 
were similar claims a gainst the British that they burned 
houses and threatened the people with f ire and the sword 
if they went over to the American side. 100 The other 
method was equally famili ar , rewards . The American 
Army's offer to men who would volunteer for the cavalry 
97Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 6, 1781, 
Greene Papers , Clements Library. 
98Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene , July 24, 
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
99colonel Lord Rawdon to Sir He nry Clinton, June 6, 
1781, Gibbes op. cit., Vol. III, p p . 90-91, and Colonel 
Robert Gray tBri tislf] , "Observations on the War in Carolina, 11 
North Carolina University Magazine , Vol . VIII, November 
1858, Draper Mss, 17VV42 (Colonel Gray served in the 
Revolutionary War in South Carolina as a Captain), and 
Proclamation of Lord Rawdon and Colone l Nesbit Balfour, 
May 24, 1781, Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. III, pp . 88-89; 
British In telligence Reportfrom Charl es ton, December 27, 
17 81, Pennsy lvania Packet , January 26, · 1782 . 
lOOHoratio Gates to Congress , (Extract), November 14, 
1780, Maryland Gazette, December 15, 1780 . 
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under Peter Horry and Hezekiah Maham was exhorbitant. The 
guaranteed annual pay was in the form of slaves. A full 
Negro slave was considered to be between ten and forty 
years of age. His value was about $400 . The annual pay 
r anged from three grown plus one small Negro for Colonels 
to one grown Negro for Privates . As additional incentives 
to join, the men were promised two-thirds of all the 
c aptured enemy items except Negroes and military stores. 
There were the further enticements of sword, pistol, 
horse, bridle , saddle and uniform . 101 All this could 
not help but inspire the young adventurer. It was for 
this type unit that the prominent men hired subst i tutes 
to obtain exemptions for themselves from militia duty. 
Militia pay was not, however , as great or glamorous. 
Prior to September 17, 1781 the pay had been _ ten shillings 
per day for privates. Governor Rutledge raised this to 
a littl e more than thirty-two shillings after that date. 1 02 
Francis Marion had the responsibility for insuring 
that everyone in the district performed militia du ty in 
accordance with the law. Surely law enforcement occupied 
as much of his time as did military operations. Marion's 
l 0lcolonel Richard Hampton to Major John Hampton, 
April 2, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 47-48 . 
The term "full Negro slave" was used a s a unit of measure 
for payment of bounties to soldiers . For purposes of 
computation, a full slave was between ten and forty years 
of age . 
l02John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 17, 
1781, Gibbes , Vol . III, pp . 163-166. 
methods of enforcing the militia laws did not always 
reflect the image of "Robin Hood." His directive to 
Peter Horry required Horry to go out and arrest a few 
shirkers and place them in jai1. 103 Governor Rutledge 
had g iven Marion the authority to condemn shirkers from 
militia duty to service in the Con t inental line. I f it 
is hard to imagine the daunted "Swamp Fox" operating in 
this manner, it must be remembered that recruiting was a 
military necessity. 
l03 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, January 12, 
.1782, Gibbes, ~- cit., Vol. III, pp. 231-232. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS OF MARION 
Leadership is defined the same for a ll military 
commanders . I t is the ability to i nf l uence others . 
Specific differences in the l eadership of military 
commanders are the problems which confront them and 
how they handle them . Leadership problems are never 
simpl e and this was no except ion in Marion's case. His 
j ob was made more diff icult by h is l eadership tasks, 
thereb y occupying much of his time. I n an effort to 
show how time consuming and all encompassing Mar i on's 
l eadership problems were, these following problem areas 
wil l be discussed : (a) Maintenance of morale of the 
p eople in his district by protecting their families and 
property from Americans and British; (b) Assuring his 
men that every effort wou ld be made in their behalf to 
free them if captured; (c) Problems of jealousy and 
personality conflicts between two of his commanders , 
Lieutenant Colonels Peter Horry and Hezekiah Maham . 
Even though Marion was constantly concerned and 
busy taking care of his men and their we l fare and sol ving 
dispu~es among the officers he had to consider the 
prope rty of the civilians in his district . I f he could 
not assure the citizens that he could protect their 
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p ro~erty from both British and American plunderers he 
wou l d not have any support. The support these people 
rendered was partly in the form of equipment, intelligence 
and provisions . Their greatest contribution however 
was the militia. These men would not have turned out 
to fo l low Marion if they had not thought their wives, 
children and property would be safe during their absence. 
Marion was aware of the terrible effects that would 
result if forces plundered the property of Americans 
or Loyalists. He was in the business of retaining the 
patriots on the American side and win~ing the Loyalists 
over--by good treatment if necessary . General Marion 
informed General Gates in Octobe r 1780, before Marion's 
district had been specifically outline d, that several 
groups, under the guise of partisans, were plundering and 
burning houses . The officers mentioned were Colonel 
Ervin and Captain Murphy. They had both left Marion's 
force because he would not tolerate the burning of any 
houses . Marion wanted Gates to know of their actions 
because he feared the blame would be laid on him. He 
said that the thing he detested most was the distressing 
of women and children . 104 · 
l04Francis Marion to Horatio Gates, October 4 and 15, 
1781, Draper Mss, 7VV67-68 . There is no information about 
Colonel Ervin or -Captain Murphy. There is a later mention 
of a Colonel Irvin (March 1781) who was one of Marion's 
Regimental Commanders. 
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This was not the only occasion on which Francis 
Marion reprimanded his own forces about pillage and plunder. 
He accused some of Peter Horry's officers and men of 
infractions several times . He referred these accusations 
to Governor Rutledge and General Greene because of Greene 's 
independent use of Horry. 105 He had similar problems with 
Hezekiah Maham. He and his men were accused of burning a 
British hospitai. 106 I n Horry's case the acts were committed 
a ga inst militiamen in Mari on ' s own brigade. 107 Maham and 
Horry, while recruiting their independe nt cavalry forces 
took more provisions, equipment and horses from the people 
in the district than was prope r. On one occasion, Colone l 
Maham impressed a horse b e longing to John Oliver . :Marion 
ordered 1Iaham to return it. Maham refused and the reply 
gave Marion the impression that Maham be lieved Marion had 
overstepped his authority . Marion threatened a court-
105Francis Marion to Peter Horry , September 23, 
1781, ·John Rutledge to Horry, October 27, 1781, Marion 
to Horry, October 29, 1781, Horry to Rutledge, October 30, 
1781,. and Rutledg e to Horry, November 4, 1781, Gib bes , 
op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 171-173, 198-203 and 206. 
l06Doyle (!3ritisl!) to Francis Marion, November 20, 
1781, and Nathanael Green~ to Marion, November 24, 1781, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 213, 215-216. 
lOJJohn Rutledge to Peter Horry, October 27, 1781, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 198-199. 
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martial and the horse was returned. As a result of this 
incident Governor Rutledge revoke d all impressment warrants . 1O8 
But even though Marion made an effort to control and 
discipline his troops concerning plunder, he (Marion) was 
accused of plundering by the British .1O9 On one occasion 
General Greene, Marion's commander, accused Marion of taking 
horses for the use of the mil itia which Greene thought could 
be put to better use by his Continental forces . With regard 
to differentiation between military stores taken by Greene 
and the plundering of the militia, Greene easily rationalized 
his own needs . For instance , the horses ridden in combat 
by the militia, even though taken from Loyalists, should, 
in Greene's opinion , be ridden by Continentals. Greene was 
upset because he knew the horses were being u sed only one-
third of the time . Greene later retracted his accusation. 
This accusation hurt l\larion's command, and t he men under 
him, fearful that Greene would take their horses , left 
Marion and returned home, taking the horses with them . 11O 
l08John Rutledge to Peter Horry, September 25, 
1781, Francis Mar ion to Hezekiah Maham, October 18, 1781, 
Rutledge to Marion, October 24 , 1781, Gibbes, op . cit., 
Vol. III, pp. 172, 194, 196-198. - --
l09colonel Watson to Francis Marion, March 9, 1781, 
Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. III, pp~ 33-34 . 
llONathanael Greene to Francis Marion, May 4, 1781, 
Greene Papers, Clements Library . Greene had previously 
mentioned his need for dragoon horses and was angry that 
Marion's militia had horses and he did not. This accusation 
hurt Marion and was one reason he threatened to resign . 
Governor John Mathews to Marion, June 15, 1782, Gibbes , 
47 
The problems of plundering encountered by Marion 
were made worse by the different views and interpretations 
held by individuals as to what constituted plunder. Colonel 
Watson of the British wrote Marion that he did not intend 
to assist his enemy. He considered " the burning of houses 
and the property of the inhabitants, who are our enemies, 
is customary in all civilized nations," but he was against 
distressing the families of the enemy . 111 General Greene 
had a similar phjlosophy and considered anything necessary 
for military operations as be ing fair game . 112 It is hard 
for a person to consider the burning of a house as fair 
and still not distress the family who inhabits the dwel ling . 
It was Marion's duty to execute the orders of his s uperiors . 
To pass down directives, like Greene did as the commander , 
and to enforce the directives , like Mar ion did, are 
entirely different . Marion made every effort to be 
specific when he sent his men out to attack the enemy . 
His orders reflected his desire to on l y inflict damage on 
military or military support items .113 
op . cit., Vol. II, pp . 190-191 . In this letter Mathews 
encouraged Mar ion to do something with the militia under 
him. Mathews considered them to be the most " incorrigibly 
obstinate and perverse beings" h e had ever met with. 
111colonel Watson to Francis Marion , March 16, 
1781, Gibbes, Vol . III, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
~12Nathanae l Greene to Thomas Sumter , April 15, 
1781, Charlestown Yearbook of 1899, App. A, pp. 88-90 . 
113Franc i s Marion to Adjutant John Postell, 
December 30, 1780, Marion to Postell, January 19, 1781, 
The problem of plundering became more critical 
when the items plunde red were to be used as part of the 
men's pay. With plunder as incentive to join the 
Continental cavalry units like those of Horry and 
48 
Maham, it was difficult, rather impossible, to comp l etely 
prevent plundering. Recruits were enlisted under the 
promise that they could retain two-thirds of all articles 
captured. They would no t be allowed to keep items 
belonging to other patriots, but that was difficult to 
regulate. By the failure to stop this practice, the 
state government implied that i t agreed with the practice . 114 
Governor Rutledge did little to assist Gene ral Marion in 
the prosecution of men accused of plundering in early 1781. 
He answered Marion ' s request for authority to punish by 
having General Greene write Marion and offer court-
martial orders to try the men militarily . No authority 
for civil prosecution was g iven . 115 By late 1781 Governor 
Rutledge had changed his approach . He ordered Marion to 
and Marion to Postell, January 29, 1781, all in James, 
op. cit., App . I. Marion to Nathanael Greene , January 31, 
178l~outhern History Association, Vol. XI, p. 193 . 
114colonel R. Hampton to John Hampton, April 2, 
1781, and Thomas Sumter to Francis Marion, March 28, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 44-48. 
115Nathanae l Greene to Francis Marion , January 16, 
1781, Southern History Association, Vol . XI, p. 189 . 
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punish any men who wasted, took or destroyed provisions . 
Any person doing such was to be prosecuted as a felon. 116 
Maintaining the men's morale by defending their 
homes and property while away fi ghting was only one-half 
the morale problem . A soldier, militia or regular, must 
have confidence in his commander. The leader is able to 
influence his men only if they think he will make decisions 
which will provide them the best prospects of survival . 
If they survive and return, all is well. But if they are 
captured by the enemy the ir morale will suffer a crippling 
blow. Personal experience has led the present writer to 
consider capture as a fate worse than death. If, however, 
the men believe their commander will exhaust every means 
available to free them, either through military operations 
or exchange, they will perform better. Mari on satisfied 
both these requirements . He did not attempt military 
operations that would place his forces in unnecessary 
danger . This was evident in mid-1782 when he minimized 
his operations in an effort to save lives. He conside red 
mos t of the fighting finished and therefore an unnecessary 
expense of lives to continue extensive operations . 117 
116J ohn Rutledge to Francis Marion , September 2, 
1781 , Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol . III, p. 131. 
117Francis Marion to Major i\licajah Ganey, June 2, 
1782, Gibbes, op: cit., Vol. II, p . 183 . 
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It was more difficult to regulate prisoners and 
their treatment than it was to control military operations. 
Marion made every effort however to insure that American 
prisoners taken by the British, and vice versa, were 
properly treated. Both the British and Americans made 
distinctions between regulars and militia. Generally 
speaking, imprisoned Continentals were treated better 
than the militia. 118 There were charges and counter-
charges of ill treatment of prisoners of war between 
Francis Marion and the British. 119 On one occasion, 
after l\Iarion had accused the British of mistreatment 
of American prisoners , Colonel Watson, a British officer 
in Charleston, said it wou ld be as difficu lt to find a 
violation of prisoners by the British as it would be to 
find a good act conm1itted by the Americans .12 0 
It was often difficult and cumbersome to retain 
prisoners after capture . To facilitate the handling of 
the prisone rs, wide u se was made of paroles . Interpretation 
118colonel Balfour ~ritis~ to Francis Marion, 
March 2, 1781 and Nathanae l Greene to Marion, August 10, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 27 and 125-126. 
119captain John Saunders [British Commandant of 
Georgetown] to Lieutenant Col onel Irvin, March 6, 1781, 
Francis Marion to Colonel Balfour, March 7, 1781, (Marion 
accused Balfour of terrible prison conditions for his 
men imprisoned by the British), and Francis Marion to 
Colonel Watson Q3ritish], March 7, 1781, Gibbes, op . cit., 
Vol. III, pp. 28-31. 
120colonel Watson to Francis Marion, March 9, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 33-34. 
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of the restraints imposed and what constituted the breaking 
of a parole by either side were items that were continuously 
questioned. The paroles released a man on his own 
recognizance . Francis Marion often granted paroles to 
his prisoners. But on several occasions he refused to 
grant paroles. For example in October 1780 he refused 
to parole a group of Loyalists because he thought that 
to give them paroles would be to acknowledge them as 
British subjects and that would cause discontent among 
his own followers. 121 
Marion was often able and will~ng to assist people 
in escaping the British but there was normall y some 
hesitation about the status of their parole. When the 
British took Charleston in May 1780, they issued paroles 
to the militia forces who surrendered there. Some of 
these paroles required the signers to remain within a 
specified distance of Charleston . Many were located at 
Haddrell's Point near Charleston which was under British 
control . In October 1780 Francis Marion said he thought 
it would be in his power to rel ease the officers who were 
confined at Haddrell's Point. He wanted to make sure 
however that they were clear of their paroles which 
121 Francis Marion to Horatio Gates, October 4, 
1780, Draper Mss, 7VV67-69. 
required them to remain within six miles of the Point . 
Marion thought that if they were not free of their 
p arol es, the attempt would not be worth hazzarding . 122 
Other me n were released to their home districts. 
However, not long after the paroles were issued the 
British required all people on parole to return and take 
u p arms for the Crown . As prisoners of war they should 
not have been required to take up arms a gainst their 
former comrades in arms. Others were stripped of their 
property b y the British. This was considered by many 
people to be a violation of the p arol e on the part of 
the British and thus the individual was released from 
the contract . It was in this latter category that one 
of Francis Marion's officers, Captain John Postell, 
became involved . 
John Postell had been a Lieutenant at the time of 
the fall of Charleston . He was parolled on May 19, 
1780 to his plantation in the Parish of St . Marks in 
Craven County. He had pledged that he would not do or 
cause anything to be done which might be "prejudicial to 
the success of his Majesty's arms, or have intercourse 
or hold correspondence with his Majesty's enemies." 
He further promised to surrender himself to the British 
at any time or place so directed by the British . Soon 
122Francis Marion to Horatio Gates, October 15, 
·1780, Draper Mss, 7VV40-42. Marion did not get a timely 
answer from General Gates and the attempt was not made. 
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after this parole was signed, he was stripped of all his 
property by the British and caused to beg for food for his 
family . He cons idered hims e lf free of the parole due to 
the British mistreatment. 123 Based on this Marion allowed 
Postell to join his brigade in January 1781. 
Postell joine d Marion's force as a Captain and 
served as Adjutant . In the latter part of February 1781, 
Postell escorted some British prisoners to an exchange 
l ocation near Georgetown . When the British arrived at 
the exchange site, Captain Postell was detained as a 
prisoner . Marion complained t o Lieut~nant Colonel 
Balfour, Commandant of Charleston, and Colonel Watson , 
Commander of the British forces i n the Charleston area . 
Marion stated that not only was Postell detained as a 
prisone r but Captain Saunders, the Commandant of Georgetown, 
refused to release the American prisoners formerly agreed 
to. 124 Marion carried on extens ive correspondence with 
the British in an effort to obtain Poste ll's release. 125 
123captain John Postell's Parole, 
1780, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 36. 
Gibbes was a true copy). 
dated May 19, 
(The parole in 
124Francis Marion to Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, 
Marion to Colonel Watson, and Marion to Captain Saunders, 
all dated March 7, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, 
pp. 29-31. 
1 25colonel Watson [British] to Francis Marion, 
March 9, 1781, Lieutenant Colonel Balfour [British] to 
Marion, March 12, 1781, Balfour to Captain Saunders 
[British] March 12, 1781, Balfour to Mar i on , March 21, 
1781, Saunders to Marion, March 24, 1781, Nathanael Greene 
to Francis Marion, May 26, 1781, Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III, 
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He wa s not successful in his attempts and it is difficult 
to de t ermine whether Marion seriously thought he could 
succeed in gett ing Postell released. He s ure ly knew 
that he had to make a v i gorous effort . I f Marion had 
not tried to get Postel l released he would have acknowledged 
that Postell had broken his parole. But that would have 
been secondary. Without the effort Marion ' s men would 
have lost confide nce in his a bility a nd desire t o protect 
them . The subsequent effect on morale would have surely 
been fatal to his r ecruitment effort and ability to 
influ ence his men . 12 6 
The last l eadership problem to be discussed here 
which confronted Marion was probably his most serious a nd 
c ontinuous. This was the dispute of rank , petty jealousy 
and mutual dislike between two Lieutenant Colone ls in 
pp . 33-13 and 80-81, and Francis Marion to Nathanael 
Greene , May 19, 1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
Marion even went so far as to r etaliate by t aki ng a 
Briti sh officer in the same manner that Postell was 
taken. Ther e is no further mention as to what l\larion did 
with Mr . Merritt (the British off i cer taken in retaliation) . 
Based on future correspondence between Marion and General 
Greene, I believe he was transferred to Greene who returned 
him to the British . 
126Nathanae l Greene to Francis Marion, August 10, 
1781 , Gibbes , op . cit ., Vol . III, pp . 125-126 . Simms, 
op . cit., pp. 262-263. Another case of the need for 
protection of the men under him was the execution of 
Colonel I saac Hayne . Although Hayne was from Marion's 
Distr ic t and worked with him , his case was handled by 
Gene ral Greene . ·Hayne became an American martyr . His 
execution prompted drastic action by Greene in the form 
of a cessation of prisoner exchanges and retaliation 
a gainst British Regular off i cers . 
Marion's District, Peter Horry and Hezekiah Maham. Both 
these men were of immeasurable value to the American 
cause in EaGtern South Carolina but their value was 
d iminished due to their inability to get along together . 
Ironically, their problem was not created by Marion but 
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by General Greene. Their animosity began through 
competition between the two men in recruitment of separate 
cavalry units at the same time, therefore competing for 
men, money and equipment . 
Genera l Greene had desired more cavalry in the 
Southern Theater and encouraged Governor Rutledge to 
raise these two cavalry units. Greene's use of these 
cavalry units was to be similar to his use of Colonel 
Henry Lee . He allowed Maham and Horry to operate 
independently answering only to him u nless attached 
to another unit . Though this independence worked well 
in itially, the system deteriorated as the war edged to 
a close . Greene began to change his tactics from 
predominantly cavalry oriented to infantry oriented 
forces but Maham and Horry were reluctant to accept a 
change in their independent status. As a result these 
two mobile units rebelled at any orders other than those 
of General Greene .127 
127Nathanael Greene to Franc is Marion, January 17, 
1782, Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
Shortly after they had begun recruitment of their 
Continental cavalry, Colonels Horry and Maham argued as 
to whom was the ranking officer in Marion's brigade . 
Maham contende d in July 1781 that he outranked Horry 
becau se of Horry ' s service as a supernumerary officer 
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and not in the regular establishment but Greene settled 
the rank dispute in favor of Horry. 128 The rank dispute 
came up a gain in 1782 when l\Iarion went to the General 
Assembly meeting at Jacksonboroug h as a Senator. On 
Marion ' s departure for the assembly, he appointed Colonel 
Horry to command in his absence . 129 l\Iaham refused to 
s erve under Horry contending that he outranked Horry. 
Greene again ruled in favor of Horry. 130 Horry advised 
Maham of this determination but Maham refused to accept 
the ruling from anyone except General Greene . 13 l 
128Nathanael Greene to Peter Horry , July 30, 1781, 
Greene Papers, Clements Library and Horry to Greene, 
August 6, 1781, Frederick R. Kirkland, op. cit . , Vol. II, 
p. 80. 
129Francis Marion to Peter Horry, January 12, 1782, 
Gibbes, op . cit ., Vol III, pp. 228-229 . 
130Nathanael Greene to Francis hlarion, January 17, 
1782, Greene Papers, Clements Library . 
131Francis Marion to Peter Horry, January 18, 1782; 
Hezekiah Maham to Horry , January 20, 1782, Nathanael Greene 
to Horry, February 1 and 1 4, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol. III, 
p p . 231-232, 238-239, 247-248 and 251-253, and Greene to 
Mari on, January 28, 1782, Southern History Association , 
Vol. XI, pp. 203-204. 
The dispute over rank and Maham's refusal to work 
directly with or for Peter Horry were major contributing 
causes to a defeat for Mari on's brigade while Mar ion was 
at the assembly. Horry had tried to get Col onel Maham 
to establish a security post but Maham refused to take 
orders from Horry . 13 2 But Horry was not a ltogether 
blameless . Marion had advised Horry to keep out small 
scouting parties of horse as security measures. Many 
of these measures were negl ected by Horry. As a result , 
about seven hundred of the British attacked Marion's 
b rigade on February 25 , 1782 at Tidyman's Plantation . 
Marion's force was routed and might have been completely 
wiped out had the enemy pursued them . 133 
With the depletion of the cavalry units of Maham 
and Horry as a result of this action, Marion recommended 
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t o Governor Mathews the consolidation of the two corps . 
Mathews and General Greene agreed to the plan and authorized 
Marion to carry out the necessary arrangements to the best 
132peter Horry to Hezekiah Maham , January 19, 
1782, Gibbes , 2£, cit . , Vol . III, pp . 238-239. 
133G. W. Greene, op. cit., Vol. II I, pp . 440-442 
and Kirkland, op . cit., pp. 80-81. Mar:i,on arrived too 
l ate to preventthe rout and the report of casualties 
fluctuated too much to be accepted as factual. The 
British claimed that the American casualties were two 
hundred, maybe three hundred , while the Americans 
reported that there wer e no more than sixteen killed, 
wounde d and missing as a result of Colonel Thompson's 
attack . Extract of a letter from South Carolina , 
March 13, 1782, Maryland Gazette , May 9, 1782 . 
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interests of the service. 134 General Greene wrote Marion 
concerning the appoin tment of the commanding officer of 
the proposed consolidated cavalry. He stated he was 
informed that Colonel Maham was the best cavalry officer 
and that most of the men that would be in the corps were 
from Maham's regiment. He further commented on Marion's 
earlier effort to obtain the position of Colonel Henderson 
for Colone l Horry . Marion tried to appease Horry by 
getting Greene and Mathews to appoint Horry as the 
replacement for Colone l Henderson who had bee n made a 
brigadier in the state militia . This was imposs ible 
because Henderson had accepted the brigadier's commiss ion 
only if he could retain his Continental Colonel's rank 
and the Governor did not intend to promote any more 
brigadiers in the state. 13 5 
Marion agreed with Greene's comments with regard 
to Maham's cavalry superiority . 136 Based on Marion's 
agreement, Greene wrote Horry t e lling him that Marion 
recommended Maham over him as the commander of the 
consolidated corps. Greene was careful to qualify his 
134Governor Mathews to Francis Marion , March 12, 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . III, pp. 270-271 . 
~35Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , March 19 , 
1782, Southern History Association, Vol. XI, pp . 205-206. 
136Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, March 27, 
1782, Southern History Association , Vol. XI, pp. 206-207 
and Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p. 279. 
comments and mentioned Marion's effort to get Horry 
appointed in the position of Colonel Henderson . 137 
Colonel Horry was mad and hurt that Maham received the 
command and he had been kicke d out of the service. 13 8 
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As a resu l t of this Marion altered his recommendation. 
I n h i s effort to appease Horry and prov ide for the defense 
of Georgetown , Marion recommended that Horry's corps be 
dismou nted . They would then be assigne d to serve as 
i nfantry for the defense of Georgetown . 139 He also 
recommended that Maham's corps be expanded to one hundred 
and twenty men . Mathews and Greene were confused and 
considere d it a new plan. Mathews objected to the 
recruitme nt for hlaham's corps because the terms of service 
would expire in four months and considered this not worth 
the expense. 140 Greene and Mathews had now become disen -
137Nathanael Greene to Peter Horry , two letters 
both date d March 29, 1782, Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III, 
pp . 280-283. 
138peter Horry to Francis Marion , and Horry to 
Nathanael Greene, April 1, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit . , 
Vol . I II, pp . 285-287. Horry was hurt that Marion had 
ended his career and he held Marion r esponsible. 
13.9Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 31, 1782 , 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. I II, pp. 284-285. 
140John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 1, 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II, p. 149 and I saac Huger to 
Thomas Sumte~June 6, 1781, Draper Mss, 7VV317 . The 
exact number of Maham's Corps after the battle with 
Thompson is not known but it is doubtful that it was 
over fifty in number because his streng th in June 1781 
was only fifty men and that had probably decreased by 
_1782, assuming the trend was the same for his corps as 
for othe r units. 
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chanted with the problems of consolidation. Greene told 
Marion to do the best he could in a way most pleasing to 
t he officers . 141 Finally, Horry's corps was dismounted 
and designated to defend Georgetown and vicinity. Maham 
r emained at the head of his cavalry as before without 
the additional troops. 
These were not all the leadership problems which 
confronted Marion but they are indicative of the responsi-
bilities he had to contend with. Everything was not easy 
for the "Swamp Fox." He was no different from other 
commanders. He had to prove himself to his subordinates 
time and again or risk the loss of their loyalty and 
support . Marion's ability and foresig ht in dealing with 
his leader ship problems exhibited his mil itary knowledge . 
He was aware that although the mission was of primary 
importance, the welfare of the men under him was a necessary 
secondary consideration which could not be overlooked. 
Without good men with good morale t he mission could not 
be accomplished and maintenance of morale is the r esponsi-
b ility of the commander, it cannot be delegated. 
141Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , April 10, 
1782, Gibbes , op . cit . , Vol . II, p . 159. 
CHAPTER I V 
THE GUERRILLA LOGISTICIAN 
The military district of Eastern South Carolina 
which Francis Marion commande d was as important logis-
tically as it was militarily. The supplies which came 
from Marion's district consisted mainly of imports through 
the port of Georgetown. The port facility provided an 
additional lifeline for the Southern Army . Prior to the 
evacuation of George town by the British the primary 
American logistical support had been obtained by means 
of overland transport from the North, limited local 
supplies, and captured British provisions . Such a 
log istical dependence reflects the tenuous nature of 
military and supply operations in the South. Biographies 
of Francis Marion cast him in almost every role except 
that of logistician. Ironically, that was probably his 
primary importance. He cannot be credited with taking 
Georgetown or single-hande dly defending i t . The British 
evacuation of Georgetown was caused more by the reduction 
of the other British posts in South Carolina , most notably 
Camden, the overall pressure of the Americans in the 
Southern Theater and Cornwallis' movement from Wilmington 
to Virginia. 
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Georgetown was the hub of a large river system near 
which large quantities of rice were grown . Control of 
Georgetown, whether intended br not, was the event which 
changed Marion's method of operations. His primary missions 
early in his career had been to maintain the morale of 
the local populace, provide intelligence and harass the 
British supply lines . By mid-1781, wi th the wi thdrawal 
of most of the British forces i nto and near Charleston, 
the logistical importance of Marion's area, particularly 
the port of Georgetown, came to the attention of the l eaders 
in the Southern Theater. This attention transforme d riiarion 
into a logistician , as much by necessity as by personal 
desire . 
Francis Marion had wanted to take Georgetown from 
the British within 58 days of his assumption of command . 
His force was never very large until 1781. He had only 
seventy men operating with him when he made his first 
attack on Georgetown on October 8, 1780. Marion and his 
men had made a sixty mile forced march to Georgetown 
which r equired only a day and a half. Upon his arrival 
he had a brief skirmish with some Loyalists under Major 
Micajah Ganey. The Loyalists quickly retreated into the 
redoubt of the town. Marion then asked the defenders, 
which consisted of about seventy Loyalists, to surrender. 
With their refusal he made an effort to draw them out . 
This maneuver was u nsuccessful and he and his men were 
forced to retreat when he received intelligence of the 
approach of a larger British force. Before he departed 
his force paraded through the town near the redoubt and 
63 
took off six horses and some of the baggage of the Loyalists 
in the defensive works . 14 2 
The purpose of this first effort against Georgetown 
is unclear. It is doubtful that Marion would or cou ld 
have tried to defend Georgetown had he been successful . 
With a force of only seventy men, and in the absence of 
General Gates' Southern Army, such a move would have 
been suicidal . 143 More than likely he was using the 
attack to boost the morale of the people in Georgetown 
and his own force . This attempt was s urely considered 
a victory, a definite necessity at this time of sagging 
American morale in the South. Marion may have apprec iate d 
the i mportance of Georgetown log istically at this time 
but it was surely a secondary consideration. 
Marion's situation did not change much prior to 
his second attempt to take Georgetown. In November 1780, 
the British still maintaine d military superiority throughout 
142Francis Marion to Horat io Gates, October 15, 
1780, Draper hlss , 7VV40 - 42 (copied from New-York Historical 
Society by Lyman C. Draper) . Marion had asked Gates 
permission to attack as ear l y as October 8 , 1780 . 
143At this t i me Gates was in North Carolina trying 
to regroup his Southern Army after his defeat at Camden 
and could not g ive Marion ass i stance . 
most of South Carolina. Marion's force r emained small . 
In early November Marion was stationed on the Santee 
River in an effort to intercept British supply boats. 
He was not very successful in this venture . At that 
time h e received in telligence that George town was 
defended by only fifty invalids . With this information 
he decided to try to take the town again. Unluckily, 
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on the night before he arrived, two hundred Loyalists 
marched into Geol~getown . The Loyalists came out and 
skirmished briefly. In the action the Loyalists lost 
three men killed and t welve as prisoners , the r est 
retreated into the redoubt. Marion was unable to attempt 
an attack on the garrison because he had only four 
rounds of ammun ition per man. The loss for :Marion ' s 
force was two men killed, one of whom was Lieutenant 
Gabriel l\larion (nephew of Francis), and three wounded. 144 
The situation in Marion ' s dis trict continued to 
favor the British in December 1780 and earl y January 1781 . 
The British superiority did not however de ter Marion's 
desire to attack Georgetown . All Marion's letters during 
the period alluded to the enemy strength in and around 
Georgetown . On December 6, 1780 he asked General Gates 
for Continental reinforcements to make his efforts more 
effective. When Marion wrote this letter he did not know 
144Francis Marion to Horat io Gates, November 21, 
1780, Draper Mss, 7VV72-73. 
that Gates had been replaced by General Nathanael Greene 
on December 4, 1780. Although Marion's letter , which 
ended up in Greene's possession, did not state that he 
intended to use the requested forces against Georgetown, 
it was apparent that this was his personal desire. 145 
Gene ral Greene 's initial actions upon assumption 
of command were directed at providing for his forces and 
becoming acquainted with his commanders . He also moved 
his headquarters southeast to the vicinity of Cheraw , 
South Carolina, about 95 miles northwest of Georgetown . 
These actions reflected a des ire on Greene's part to 
resume the American effort in the Southern Theater . 
His intentions were further evidenced when he sent 
Colone l Henry Lee to j o in Marion for the purpose of 
attacking Georgetown.146 This mission was undertaken on 
January 25, 1781 and fail ed . Lee blamed the guides who 
he said became los t . 147 Marion attributed the failure 
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to a lack of artillery support. In any event, Georgetown 
remained in British hands after this t hird attempt. 1 48 
145Francis Marion to Horatio Gates , December 6, 
1780, Marion to Nathanael Greene, December 22, 1780 and 
January 9, 1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library . 
146Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , January 23, 
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
147Henry Lee to Nathanael Greene , January 25, 1781, 
Greene Papers , Clements Library . 
148Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, January 27, 
_1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
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The future logistical importance of Georgetown was 
evide n t l y not apparent to Greene, Marion or anyone else 
at this time. Greene was more interested in initiat i ng 
operations a gainst the British and surely did not want 
to tie down any forces in a defensive postu re . Marion 
did not want to get i nvolved in the logistical business 
but rather wanted to demonstrate to the people in his 
district that positive action was being taken in their 
behalf. Had Mar i on and Lee been successfu l against 
Georgetown i t i s certain they could not have occupied 
or utilized the town logistically at this time due to 
Brit ish strength . Greene had moved his headquarters 
to Cheraw by thi s time bu t Cornwallis' forces caused 
Greene to begin a withdrawal north in February 1781 . 
The wi t hdrawal ended with the Battle of Guilford Court 
House , near Greensboro, North Carolina . After this 
fig ht Cornwallis went to Wilmington and Greene returne d 
to South Carolina in the vicin i ty of Camden , about 95 
miles west northwest of Georgetown . 
In March of 1781 the British began taking actions 
which indicated they had doubts about the safety of 
Georgetown . They closed the port to al l ships except 
those operating to and from Charl eston . The British 
apparently desired to maintain onl y the minimum necessary 
s upplies i n the town. They forbid unloading any vessel 
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without approval from Charleston.149 Soon after this 
dec ision by the British, the American forces began reducing 
the British posts between Charleston and Camden, thus 
negating the usefulness of Georgetown . 
Marion and Lee were again united in April 1781 
to take Fort Watson . In May they also successfully l aid 
siege to Fort Motte. Up to this time Marion had bee n too 
busy to attack Georgetown and had no thoughts about it 
logistically . B~t immediately after the capitulation of 
Fort Motte he became anxious a ga in. On May 19, 1781 he 
began correspondence with General Greene in an effort to 
obtain permission to attack Georgetown . He needed Greene's 
approval because at the time he was attached to General 
Thomas Sumter for operations south of Georgetown. Marion's 
basis for reques ting approval was the fact that the British 
garrison at Georgetown numbere d only eighty British soldiers . 
He also be lieved that the reduction of Georgetown would 
cause the Loyalists around the Little Pedee River and 
Waccamaw River to cease actions against him. The Loyalists 
in the area under Major Ganey had proved to be particularly 
troublesome to Marion's operations in the district . 150 
It is interesting to note that Marion did not us e the 
149colonel Nesbit Balfour [Commandant of Charlestoaj 
to Colonel Cassels [Commandan t of George town], March 13, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 37. 
15°Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 19 and 
20, 1781, Greene Papers , Clements Library. 
logistical capability of Georgetown as an argument to 
attack . This causes one to believe that his desire to 
take Georgetown was still oriented more toward the 
improvement of district morale than toward logistical 
support. 
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Greene qualified his approval for Marion to attack 
Georgetown. He authorized the effort if the enemy was 
not making preparations to move in support of Ninety Six 
or Augus ta which Greene was in the process of besieging. 
He further stated that Marion must receive General Sumter's 
assurance that with Marion's departure to Georgetown, 
Sumter would not be too exposed to the British. 151 
General Sumter was also equivocal about approval for 
Marion to go against George town. Marion went anyway. 152 
It is readily apparent that Greene did not appreciate the 
logistical value of George town or know the magnitude of 
supplies the British had stored there. In his letter 
to Marion dated May 26, 1781, Greene said he conside red 
Georgetown to be an "inferior object. 11 153 Marion went 
to Georgetown anyway, arriving on May 28, 1781. He 
1 ~1Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, May 26, 1781, 
Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 80-81 and Greene to Thomas 
Sumter, May 26, 1781, Charleston Yearbook of 1899, App. A, 
p. 103, and Draper Mss , 7VV305-307. 
152Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, June 7, 1781, 
Draper Mss, 7VV320-322. 
1 ~3.Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, May 26, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 80-81. 
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immediately opened s iege entrenchments. The British 
however evacuated the post during the evening and boarded 
ships. The ships moved only a short distance away from 
the port. 154 Marion wrote Greene that he was in the 
process of leveling the British defenses and had found 
a l arge quantity of salt for the use of the Southern 
Army. He would have left Georgetown sooner and returned 
to his position south of the Santee River but h e was 
appre hensive that the British would return to Georgetown 
and destroy all the provisions h e h ad captured . At this 
time he requested some Continental regulars to assist 
him in guarding the provisions against British reprisal . 
He considered h i s present force to be insufficient to 
prevent great destruction if the Britis h made such an 
attempt. Greene was unable to send the requested 
assistance at this t~me .155 
In any other situation Greene would probably have 
apprec i ated the logistical importance of Georgetown. But 
154Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 29, 
1781, Southern History Association, Vol. XI, pp. 197-198. 
1 55Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, June 5, 1781, 
Greene Papers, Clements Library . Greene was beseiging 
Ninety Six and feared that the British would relieve the 
garrison there . His fears were realized when Lord Rawdon 
[Britisti] marched to the assistance of Ninety Six . Greene 
was not happy because he had wanted to fight the British 
in a decisive battle . But because Marion was in Georgetown 
and Pickens was in the back country, Greene was un a ble to 
mass his forces against Rawdon. 
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a t this time he had the necessary but not excessive 
suppl i es. He had written General George Washington i n 
December 17 30 and identified his lack of complete logistical 
support . 1 56 It was apparent that as a former Quartermaster 
General of the Continental Army that he appreciated the 
importance of supplies to an army . But at this time 
Greene was in Southern South Carolina, Ninety S i x, and 
Georgetown was def i nitely not as important as it wou l d 
b ecome later when he moved back to the vicinity of the 
High Hil l s of Santee River. Marion himself began to 
appreciate the logistical importance of Georgetown in 
June 1781 and he tried to convince Greene. He wrote 
Greene that Georgetown was "the only place where we may 
draw an [siaj quantity of subsistence for the Army . ,,157 
However Greene still considered the acquisi tion of 
Georgetown as important only to Marion's own district 
and not to the entire Southern Army .158 
I t was not until December 1781 that General Greene 
began to use Georgetown extensivel y as a logistical base . 
His usage of Georgetown for supplies and appreciation 
of its logistical importance continued to grow in 
156Nathanael Greene to George Washington , December 28, 
1780 , George Washington Papers, op. cit . , Reel 73. 
1 57Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, J u ne 5 , 1 781 , 
Greene Papers, Clements Library . 
1 58Nathanael Gree ne to Francis Marion, June 10, 1781, 
James , op . cit . , App . 1 . 
71 
1782. 159 Greene's fear that the British might try to 
return to Georgetown and take or destroy his supply base 
there caused him to caution Marion and the people of 
Georgetown about its defense and the safety of the 
supplies . 160 In May 1782 General Greene appointed Samuel 
Dwight as Commissary of issues and i'\lr . White as Commissary 
of purchases for Georgetown . 1 61 His concern for the 
safety of the· supplies at Georgetown continued into the 
end of July . At that time he again cautioned Marion and 
told him to activate all the militia necessary to protect 
the port. Marion was further directe4 to move the supplies 
up the rivers away from Georgetown. 162 The thought and 
fear of losing Georgetown, particularly the supplies, 
caused Greene great concern . 163 
Governor Rutledge had become interested in the 
supplies and trade. of Georgetown as early as October 24, 
159Nathanael Greene to Peter Horry, December 14, 
1781, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. III, pp . 222-223 and Greene 
to Francis i'\larion, January 3, 1782, Southern History 
Association, Vol. XI, p . 201. 
160Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, March 1, 
1782, Southern History Association, Vol . XI, pp . 204-205. 
161Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 24, 1782, 
Gibbes , op . cit. , Vol. II, pp. 179-180. 
162Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, July 27, 
1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. II, p. 202. 
163Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , July 30, 
1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol . II, pp. 203-204. 
1781 . 164 Governor Rutledge' s successor as Governor , 
John Mathews , continued to be interested in Georgetown , 
especially the encouragement of trade there. Mathews 
even went so far as to commission George He riot t , a 
merchant, to make a survey of t he provisions available 
around Georgetown . His main interest in the supplies 
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there was caused by the fact that the southern part of 
South Carolina had been str i pped bare due to the operations 
of Greene and the British Commande r, Lord Rawdon, around 
Ninety Six and Augusta .165 By April 1782 Marion did not 
have to worry about interest in Georgetown by the Governor 
and Command ing Ge ne ral. He now had more he lp and advice 
than he could possibly want . 
The acquisition of Georgetown enlarged Francis 
Marion's du t i es considerably. He was forced by circum-
stances to spend more time with l ogistical , admin i strative 
and defensive matters . This l ed t o a decrease in his 
military operations . He was now burdened with responsi-
bilities similar t o those which the British had previously. 
If i t were necessary to determine the point in t i me that 
Francis Marion ' s tactics changed from guerrilla to 
conve n tion a l, it would be May 28, 1781, the date the 
164John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 24 , 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 196-198 . 
165John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 15, 
1782, Gibbes , £E · cit., Vol . II. pp. 1 64-165 . 
British evacuated and Mar ion occupied Georgetown . His 
actions then changed from covert to overt and he had to 
appoint a garr ison commander, prepare his defenses and 
defend the town and supplies against the British. 
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General Marion, after leveling the British defensive 
works in Georgetown, l eft command of Georgetown in the 
hands of local mili t ia leaders. He did provide guidance 
to the militia commanders in the area through Lieutenan t 
Colonel Hugh Horry, the commander of most of the militia 
units around Georgetown. Marion closely guarded his 
control of the port and when General Thomas Sumter sent 
an officer , Captain W. K. Davis, to Georgetown he cautioned 
Sumter that this move might interfere wi th his command 
there.166 Marion later transferred the responsibility of 
command of George town and vicinity to Colonel Peter Horry. 
This change occurred in March 1782 when Marion converted 
Peter Harry' s cavalry to infantry. The change was 
necessitated by the increased importance of Georg etown 
logistically and Marion's desire to retain command there 
by appointing an officer who wou ld outrank Sumter's 
Captain. At that time Marion gave Horry explicit 
directions for the control of Georgetown . Particular 
attention was to be paid to the defense of trade and 
166Francis Marion to Thomas Sumter, July 26, 
1781, Draper Mss , 7VV436. Hug h Horry was the brother of 
Peter Horry and had preceded Marion as commander of the 
Williamsburg Militia. 
all vessels arriving at the port . Horry was to regulate 
trade and contro l all other mat ters for the good of the 
service . 1 67 Marion similarly designated an assistant 
commandant . This appointment allowed Horry to move 
around the countryside and defend the local crops and 
cattle. 168 
When he first took Georgetown in May 1781, he had 
destroyed the British defensive works, not r ealizing the 
future importanc~ of the port . After the log istical 
importance became apparent, there were insufficient 
74 
funds for construction, but a defens ive plan was necessary . 
The measures he employed were passive moving the supplies 
up the river as suggested by General Greene , Greene and 
Marion thought Georgetown would be safe i f the supplies 
were inaccess ible.169 He employed a mobile rather than 
a position type defense . Even though he thought he would 
b e able to defend Georgetown and the surrounding are as 
against the Brit i sh foraging parties with a mobile force, 
h e was very pessimistic with r egard to defense of supp l ies 
1 67Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 7 and 31, 
1781, Gibbes, op . cit . , Vol. III, pp. 264 and 284-285 . 
168Francis Marion to Peter Horry, April 18, 1782, 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp . 166-167. The assistant 
Commandant was Colone l Moultrie, one of Marion's Regimental 
Commanders who was waiting for his Regiment to report 
for duty . 
. __ 16_9Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, March 1, 
1782, Southe rn History Association, Vol . XI, pp . 204-205. 
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south of the Santee River.170 He viewed Georgetown's 
greatest threats as being by water from Charleston and 
on land from the Loyalists along the Pedee River under 
Major Micajah Ganey.17 1 
On February 6, 1782 the leg islature passed an act 
entitled "An Act for the better Defense and Security of 
this State during the Recess of the General Assembly." 
Section 3 of the act authorized the erection or repair 
of garrison forts and fort ifications for the better 
defense of the state . 172 An engineer officer, Colone l 
Christian Senf, was sent to discuss building such defenses 
for Georgetown . Colonel Senf obtained the supervisors 
and labor for the project. 173 Marion sent additional 
artillerymen to Georgetown and orde red militia rein-
forcements.174 Based on a suggestion by Peter Horry in 
March 1782, Mar ion provided guidance for the outfitting 
170Francis Marion to Thomas Sumter, June 6, 1781, 
Draper Mss , 7VV315-316 , Marion to Nathanael Greene, 
August 13, 1781, and William Harden to Marion, August 15, 
1781, Greene Papers, Cleme nts Library. 
171Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 25, 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. II, pp . 180-181 . 
_172General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 
1782, op. cit . 
173John Mathews, to Francis Marion , March 4, 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p. 263. 
174Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 7, 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p . 264. 
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of a s chooner for defensive purposes .175 This vessel was 
to be posit ioned at the confluence of the Waccamaw, Pe dee 
and Sampit Uivers . 176 However the schooner was not placed 
on station un t il October . 177 
The new defensive posture did not change Marion's 
plan to move up r i ver as many supplies as possible . 
Marion personally ou t lined the fortifications for a de pot 
at Black Mingo, about twenty miles northwest of Georgetown, 
for the storage of supplies which were moved .178 Greene 
did not make l\Iarion's job of improving defenses any 
easier. During the middle of 1782 when Marion was trying 
to build the fort ifications , Gene r a l Greene was continually 
calling out the militia for one last large engagement 
against the British . 179 Marion also called up his militia 
at the slightest indication that the British or Loyalists 
175Francis Marion to Peter Horry , March 12 , 1782, 
Gibbes, op . c i t . , Vol . III. p . 270. 
176Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 25, 1782, 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . II, pp . 180-181 . 
177John Mathews to Francis Mari o n, September 18, 
1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol . II, p . 228. 
178Francis l\Iarion to Peter Horry, March 13, 1782, 
Gibbes , op . cit ., Vol. III, pp . 271-272. The de pot was 
to b e situated so that it could control the river by musket 
shot. I t was to be round with a high abbat i s . A block-
house seventeen feet square was to be erected in t he center 
of the fort at a h eight to overlook the parapet . It was 
similar to an in ternal Maham tower . There were to be no 
gates and portable ladders were to be use d so they could 
be taken in every night. 
179Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, April 28, 
1782, Gibbes , op . cit ., Vol. II, pp . 171-172. 
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might attack Georgetown . Marion solved this flexible 
callup system by directing Horry to call in two companies 
of militia around Georgetown whenever the main force was 
operating away from the area with Greene. 180 
Even these extensive preparations did not completely 
deter the British . General Greene issued a warning to 
Marion on June 9, 1782 that the British were preparing 
three galleys for the destruction of stores in Georgetown. 181 
Marion relayed t~e warning to Horry . 182 Greene believed 
the situation was becoming more serious on July 27, 1782 
and he wrote Marion stating that the British, with seven 
hundred men, were embarking for Georgetown and were 
expected to arrive within twenty four hours . Greene was 
worried lest the supp lies in Georgetown, which he termed 
"immense," would fall into British hands . According to 
Greene the only defense woul d be to remove all the supplies 
from Georgetown . 183 Greene ' s l etter did not arrive until 
Ju 1 y 3 0 , 178 0 . 
180Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 8 and May 21 
and 24, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit ., Vol. II, pp . 177-180 and 
Vol. III, pp . 266- 267.- --
lSlNathanael Greene to Francis Marion, June 9, 1782, 
Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. II, p. 187 . 
l82 Francis Marion to Peter Horry , June 9 and 15, 
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 187- 188 and 191 . 
183Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , July 27, 
1782, Gibbes, op. cit. , Vol . II, p. 202. 
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Greene and Governor Mathews were very p ess imist i c 
about any hope of defending Georgetown with this d e lay. 184 
The Governor felt that Georgetown would inevi tabl y fall 
and that such an event would be a dreadful stroke to the 
American side. 185 Marion r eache d Georgetown before the 
British advance . The military stores in Georgetown had 
already been moved to Black Mingo by Marion's men. The 
British did not make an attempt on Georgetown i tsel f , 
prefe rring to po?ition themselves on the south branch of 
the Santee River and carry off rice , of which t here were 
about 800 barrels of finished rice on t hat branch. The 
British position on a narrow neck of land made it 
impract i cable for Marion to annoy them . Marion ' s men 
had moved the stores of George town but not those alon g 
the south branch of the Santee . Marion viewed the loss 
of rice as serious but there was nothing he could do 
about it . 186 Though the Br i tish threatened more raids 
of this type they never carried them out around George town. 187 
18 4Nathanae l Greene t o Francis Mar ion, July 30, 
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 203-204. 
l85John Mathews to Francis Marion, July 30, 1782 , 
Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. II, p. 203. 
186Francis Marion to Nathanae l Greene, Au gust 1, 
1782, Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
187Ge neral Alexander Leslie to Nathanael Gree ne , 
August 13, 1782, Mary l and Gazette, October 17, 1782. 
The defensive problems were only incide n tal to 
Marion's responsibili ty of opera ting the port f acility . 
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He had to encourage trade while regulating the prices . 
Marion's efforts in controlling trade inc luded estab-
lishment of prices and approval of exchanges of goods . 
Trade regulation was further complicated a nd confused b y 
the e xcessive number of commissaries from various military 
units all congregated in Georgetown . In t i me , General 
Greene, General Sumter and General Marion al l h ad at 
l east one supply r e presentative in Georgetown seeking 
supplies for their own force. 18 8 
Trade in Georgetown was insignifican t until September 
1781. But the trade was not simply a matter of buying 
and selling--it was really trading. Payment for goods 
purchased varied with the season and marketability of the 
products . Some dealers wou ld accept almost anything in 
payme n t for the ir merchandi se. Captain Putnam was one of 
these accepting indigo , rice, Negroes and bills on France 
in payment for his goods, which cons i sted of almost every 
i tem imag inable from liquor to blankets . 189 Other merchants 
were more selective in their r equirements for payment. 
188 Francis Mar ion to Peter Horry, May 24, 1782 , 
Gib bes, op . cit. , Vol. I I, pp . 179 - 180 and Will iam Swinton 
to Mario~ October 9, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, 
pp. 183-184 . Greene had two representatives there . 
189william Swinton to Francis Mar ion, October 9, 
1781, Gibbes, op . cit . , Vol . I II, pp. 1 83-184. 
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During one season they would accept only indigo , valued 
at one pound indigo equal to three pounds sterling, and 
one month later would accept only rice . Their demands 
depended on the market at the other end of their trade 
route.190 There were two things however on which all 
me rchants agreed, they must b e paid and they must receive 
a profit or they would not return and Marion made every 
effort to ensure both.191 
In his efforts to increase trade and at the same 
time provide the necessary military supplies, Marion 
established himself as the approving authority on the 
prices for all necessities throug h his own commissary, 
William Swinton. 192 Import items considered as military 
necessities by hlarion cons i sted of salt, s ugar, coffee , 
tea and medicines. As an example, he established the 
price of salt at four dollars per bushel. A policy of 
leniency of price was a llowed with luxury items which 
were to be sold at any price the seller pleased.193 
Marion's regulation of trade lasted only until Governor 
190Peter Horry to Francis Marion , March 11 and 
June 29, 1782 , Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 268-270 
and Vol. II, p. 196. 
191Francis Marion to Peter Horry, April 19 and 
July 4, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 169 and 196. 
l92William Swinton to Francis Marion , October 9, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 183-184. 
193Franc is Marion to Peter Horry, March 7 and 12, 
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 264-270. 
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Mathews came to power . He ordered Marion to cease his 
practice of regulating trade because he considered such 
practices to be stumbling blocks to increased trade in 
Georgetown which would hurt the army and state. 194 
Mathews' directive was poorly timed and stimulated 
inflation. It was at this time that every large military 
unit had its own commissary in Georgetown which created 
more competition among buyers than among sellers.19 5 
However a more pressing and constant problem 
existed in the threat of American Privateers. If vessels 
could not enter the port with their supplies there would 
be no trade to regulate. No protection could be given 
to the merchants at sea but Marion did all in his power 
to protect them once they arrived at the port. He also 
gave merchants passes but they were normally disregarded 
by the privateers . The privateers stopped the trading 
vessels at the entrance to Georgetown and virtually 
eliminated all trade . 1 96 These privateers were so 
brazen that they even sailed up the rivers and plundered 
l94John Mathews to Francis Marion, May 1, 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II,_ pp. 172-173. 
19~Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 24, 1782, 
Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. II, pp. 179-180. 
196Peter Horry to Francis Marion, March 11, 1782, 
Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol. III, pp. 268-270. 
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plantations near the river banks. They took Negroes and 
other property under the pretense ttat the owners were 
Loyalists. Many times the owners were friendly to America 
and, in any event, all Loyalist property reverted to 
state prope rty. Governor Rutledge directed Marion to halt 
this notorious practice by stopping and inventorying the 
cargo of all boats on the rivers . These boats wer e to 
be held until Rutledge made a dete rmination for their 
disposition or release . 197 
Most of the privateers were under commissions from 
either the Continental Congr ess or some other s tate 
governme nt. The privateers wou ld hal t a vessel on the 
bas is or under the pretense that it was carrying contraband 
goods . After capture the privateers would petition a 
"Judge of the Admiralty" to h ave the case l egally trie d. 
The decision normally ended in favor of the privateers. 198 
These excesses by privateers were not isolated in South 
Carolina,and as a result, the Continental Congress 
eventually took action against unlimited privateer ing 
by enacting a new law on July 10, 1782. The old law 
authorized any United States vessel to capture any enemy 
197John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 12, 
1781, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 188-189. 
198John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 15, 1782 
and Marion to Horry, April 22, 1782, Gibbes , op. cit., 
Vol. II, pp. 164-165 and 169-170 . - --
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vessel commissioned as man of war or privateer and retain 
the entire load of property. The new law directed that 
if the vessel capturing was smaller than that captured, 
the capturing vessel could keep the entire property 
captured . If , however, the capturing vessel was larger 
than the one captured, the capturing ship could retain 
one-half the cargo and the American Government would 
receive the other half . 199 Marion later sought to 
discourage unlimited privateer actions by using the 
Georgetown schooner to protect merchants in and around 
Georgetown . 200 
These preventive measures were successful and trade 
increased greatly by October 1782. Colonel R. Lushington, 
who replaced Colonel Peter Horry as commandant of 
Georgetown in July 1782, c l aimed in October that he had 
personal l y obtained $30,000 worth of supplies for the 
Army during his tour at Georgetown. This reflects only 
one man's efforts for a three month period and the 
logistical significance of a port which General Greene 
had termed as an "inferior object" in 1781. 20l 
199 J~urn.als of the · Continen·t -al· Congress, 177 4-1789 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914), Vol. XXI I, 
pp. 379-380. 
200captain John .Milligan to Francis Marion, October 27 
and 31, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. II, pp. 240 and 244. 
201colonel R. Lushington .to · Francis Marion, 
October 31, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 245. 
It is difficult to determine the exact date Col. Lushington 
Of course privateers were not the only threat to 
trade and all the Army's supplies did not come through 
Georgetown. Marion and his men still had to protect 
the supplies throughout the countryside against the 
British. The protection of s upplies already in hand 
is an assumed mission for any mili tary commander and 
was nothing n ew for Marion. By protecting the supplies 
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on hand, Marion denied supplies to the British. He was 
extremely active in his operations to harass and deny 
logistical support from the very beginning of his guerrilla 
movements. Marion understood the importance of the denial 
mission and readily received and executed General Greene's 
orders in that regard. 202 
All item~ were important to Marion when harassing 
enemy supply lines but there were some items which were 
more importan t from the standpoint of denial operations . 
The supplies of primary importance in Marion's district 
were salt, rice, cattle and horses. A considerable 
quantity of salt was produced along the Waccamaw River. 
replaced Horry in Georgetown but correspondence between 
Marion and Horry indicates that it was in July 1782 . 
Col . Lushington made his claim of trade using Guineas, 
6,000 . The value of the Guinea was about $5.00, therefore 
$30,000. 
202General Isaac Huger to Francis Marion, January 28, 
1781, James, op. cit., App. A, Marion to Greene, June 16, 
1781, Greene Papers , Clements Library, Greene to Marion, 
December 13, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 221-222, 
and Simms, op . cit., p. 192-.- --
That section of the district was particularly friendly 
to the British while they controlled Georgetown. Salt 
was equal in importance to any other item of supply. 
They used it to preserve meats and salt was a necessary 
part of a man 's diet in such a hot and humid climate . 203 
Greene considered the need for salt to be so important 
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that he informed the President of the Continental Congress, 
Samuel Huntingdon, when in May of 1781, Marion and Henry Lee 
cut the enemy's supply of salt, of which Greene's own 
supply was almost totally unprovided. 204 When the British 
evacuated Georgetown, Marion considered his most important 
acquisition to be the salt left by the British. He 
attached the same significance to his search for salt as 
he did in the leveling of the British defensive works. 205 
Salt was perhaps Marion' s major logistical contri-
bution to the supply effort . Correspondence to and from 
Marion indicates that h e was the primary disburser of salt 
in Sout h Carolina . As previously stated, salt was produced 
along the Waccamaw River in .Marion's district. The men who 
produced the salt did not want to serve in the American 
203Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, January 1, 
1781, Greene Papers , Clements Library. 
204Nathanae l Green e to Samuel Huntingdon, May 14, 
1781, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 70-72. 
205Franci~ Marion to Nathanael Greene, June 5, 
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
86 
militia. The need for their supply of salt was so great 
however that Governor Rutledge authorized Marion to grant 
exemptions from militia duty in return for their production 
of salt . 206 Marion provide d salt to Rutledge, Sumter and 
Greene . 207 Greene had only a small supply of salt due to 
the poor overland transportation from the North. He 
therefore looked to Ge neral Marion for his supply.208 
Marion's source of supp ly of salt was not limited to his 
own district. He receive d an enormous amount of salt in 
trade throug h Georgetown. One sing le shipment in 
February 1782 amounted to fifteen hundre d bushe l s from 
Bermuda . 209 The main function of the de pot built by 
Marion at Black Ming o in hlarch 1782 was the storage of 
salt. 210 
Marion and hi s me n also spent a considerable amount 
of time and effort in denying the British rice. They 
206John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 16, 
1781, Gibbe s, op. cit., Vol . III, pp . 190-192. 
207John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 16, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 192-193 and 
Rutledge to Thomas Sumter, November 8, 1781, Draper Mss, 
7VV514-515. 
208Nathanael Gree n~ to Francis Marion, October 16, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p . 194 . 
209noughty and Bryan [Merchants] to Francis Marion, 
February 17, 1782, Gibbe s, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 253-254. 
2.1~Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 13, 17 82, 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 271-272. 
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endeavored to move all the rice which was near or easily 
accessible to the British . They normally moved it by 
water . Since the tonnage and quantity involved was so 
much greater than that of salt, the manpower requirement 
was enormous. To move the rice Marion had to employ 
every available boat and Negro in the area. 21 1 Although 
the rice was located in Marion's district, he did not 
exercise the same autocratic control over it as he did 
with salt. Marion protected the rice but control of this 
commodity in Marion's district was exercised by Colonel 
Grimk~ . Marion had to request his own supply of rice 
from Grimk~ just l ike everyone else. Grimk~ was one of 
the confiscation commissioners and as such was tasked 
with the responsibility of disbursing the property of 
the confiscated estates. 212 
Marion was also required to provide men for the 
movement and rounding up of cattle in the district . I t 
r equ ired less manpower but the necessity of denial was 
of major importance . Marion used his initiative in 
211Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene , January 9 , 
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library . 
212Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 29, 1782, 
Greene Papers, Clements Library, Marion to Colonel Grimk~, 
April 9 , 1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, and Angelina 
/ - --Grimke Weld to Lyman C. Draper, April 24, 1874, Draper Mss, 
15VV162-163. This Colonel Grimke was probably the father 
of the famous abolitionist Grimke sisters . Angelina 
states that her father was a Colonel in the American 
forces . He was educated well enough to have acted in the 
.job of confiscation commissioner having rece i ved a degree 
from Oxford before the war began. 
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moving all the cattle he could find away from the British. 
He sought to move the cattle located near Charleston to 
the north s~de of the Santee River where he could better 
control and protect them . 213 Greene was as interested 
in denying the British horses as he was in preventing 
foodstuffs from reaching them . It was his contention 
that if the British could not obtain horses they could 
not afford to venture far out of Charleston. This would 
be caused by their insufficient transportation capability 
and they would therefore be unable to resupply themselves. 
Greene directed Marion to p e rsonally gather all the horses 
in his district and move them out of the reach of the 
British. This responsibility was not to be delegated to 
the people bec ause Greene did not believe they wou ld 
carry out the order . 214 
The denial and harassment ope rations were very 
effective throug h the first half of 1781. At that time 
Marion informe d Greene that the people of Charleston were 
greatly distressed for the want of fresh provisions. 215 
213Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, June 16, 
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library . 
214Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, December 27, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 226-227. The area 
where Marion was to effect this mission was the area around 
Charleston. Althou gh the people probably objected, no 
specific instances were found. Marion later (see Chapter V) 
received the mission to halt trade in this same area . 
215Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, June 25, 
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library. 
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The efforts of all the American forces in the South t o 
reduce the chain of f or ts between Charleston and Camden 
had also cu ·; the supply line and caused the Br itish to 
withdraw in to the vicinity of Charleston. With the advent 
of the increased strength and improved tactical position 
of the Americans in the South, the denial operations 
changed slightly. The British were forced to make forays 
out of Charleston to plunder the countryside, thus 
necessitating American defenses a gainst tactics similar 
to those they had employed only a few months earlier. 
The British were also encouraging trade wi th the people 
out in the country. The British were so s uccessful in 
obtaining supplies by these methods that Governor Mathews 
was moved to comment in Augus t 1782 that the Charleston 
markets had a great quantity of all items needed on a 
daily basis . 216 This was quite a di fferen t situation than 
that which existed in June 1781 . Although the British 
had been uns uccessful militarily in the interim period , 
their log i st ical pos i tion had improved to the point of 
plenty. 
Gover nor Mathews assigned Marion the mission of 
halting the trade between Charleston and the countryside. 
Marion's plan to effect this order was simple, move all 
the people dealing with the British, confiscate their 
216John Math ews to Francis Marion , August 29, 
_1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol . II, pp . 215-216. 
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property, and prosecute them under the sedition act. 217 
In actions typical of twentieth century politicians, 
Governor Mathews and the Privy Council disapproved his 
plan. 218 Although Marion's efforts were limited by 
Governor Mathews and the Council, the denial of trade 
probably contributed to the British evacuation of 
Charleston a month and a half later on December 14, 1782. 
The military requirements placed on Francis Marion 
did not in any way cause the logistical demands placed 
on him to b e lightened. These demands came from General 
Greene , Governor Rutledge , and after him, Governor Mathews . 
In addition to limited military operations, trade regulation, 
defensive operations and logistical denial efforts, he 
received requisitions for supplies . With all these 
respons ibilities it is not hard to understand that 
Marion's military operations were curtailed. 
217Franc is Marion to John Mathews, September 24, 
1782, Gibbes , op. cit ., Vol. II, pp. 231-232. 
218John Mathews to Francis Marion , Oc tober 6 and 15, 
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 232-234. These 
politicians gave-th e military commanders a mission and 
then tied their hands by failing to give them the authority 
necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. 
CHAPTER V 
MARION AND POLITICS 
General Marion answered to the politicians of the 
state whose demands increased his duties. During Marion's 
tenure as a militia brigadier in Eastern South Carolina 
he served under two governors, John Rutledge (1776-1778 
and 1779-1782) and John Mathews (1782-1783). Governor 
Rutledge's powers as governor were expanded by the Privy 
Council in Fe bruary 1780 during the British siege of 
Charleston. The members of the council, fearful for 
their families and prope rty and anxious to adjourn, 
authorized Rutledge to take any actions he deemed 
necessary in governing the state. He was, however, to 
consult the Privy Council if convenient . 219 Five of 
the members of the council remained in Charleston and 
were taken as prisone rs by the British . The governor 
and the remaining three members fled to remote parts 
of the state. Thus Governor Rutledge had de facto 
dictatorial powers . 220 This proved to be an excellent 
219Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 75-75 and Appendix B, 
p. 286. The council madeone exception to Rutledge 's 
powers. He could not order the taking of a life of a 
citizen without a public trial . 
220Moultrie, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 105-106. 
General Lincoln urgedthe governor and council (eight 
92 
and ·necessary decision. Rutledge acted boldly and 
positively when the public spirit lagged. He did not 
however retain his autocratic powers any longer than 
necessary and as soon as possible he initiated elections 
and convened another General Assembly.22 1 
Governor Rutledge, though possessed with dictatorial 
powers, consulted military commanders regarding military 
affairs. He was careful to consult with the brigadiers 
and General Greene in matters of a military nature. 222 
He evidently tru sted their integrity and abilities . The 
governor sent blank officer commissions to the militia 
commanders and did not personally approve each appointment, 
though the granting of commissions would have been a 
valuable political tooi. 223 He kept the commanders 
informed of his actions that would affect military 
members) to leave Charleston saying their services would 
be more valuable in the state than as prisoners. Governor 
Rutledge did not want to leave and said the people would 
think he let them down . The final decision was that the 
governor and three membe rs (Charles Pinckney, John Lewis 
Gervais and Daniel Huger) would leave Charleston. The 
remaining five members (which included Christopher Gadsden) 
would remain in Charleston. They were subsequently sent 
to St. Augustine and later (1781) released. 
221McGrady, op. cit ., pp. 319, 432 and 528 and 
MacMillan, op. cit.-,-pp~5, 76 and 231-233. The General 
Assembly wasconvened at Jacksonborough, South Carolina 
on January 8, 1782. 
222J ohn Rutledg ~ to Francis Marion, September 15, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol. III, pp. 162-163. 
223John Rutledge to Francis Marion, March 8 and 
September 17, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 32-33 
and 163-166. 
93 
operations to prevent delay and confus ion . 224 He also 
consulted with them regarding civil affairs that he thought 
would have a future bearing on the military situation. 225 
Although Governor Rutledge delegated considerable authority, 
he still maintained control of the situation and was 
respected by a11.226 
Rutl e dge used the brigadiers considerably in the 
civil operation of the state, thereby placing additional 
burdens on them but at the same time increas ing their 
influence in their districts . In his desire to return 
the state to civil law as early as possible he directed 
the brigadiers to recommend men for the position of 
Ordinary in the civil districts of their area of responsi-
bility.227 Within Marion's area he was to appoint men to 
224As examples he informed them before hand of his 
intentions of granting pardons to Loyalis ts to come over 
to the American side (to be covered later) and of his 
issuance of passes to individuals, thus facilitating the 
passage of those persons and validating the passes. 
The problems of verifying t h e validity of passes was 
time consuming for the brigadiers who had to be especially 
watchful of illegal passage by British sympathizers. 
225John Rutledge to Francis Marion , September 15, 
1781, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, pp . 162-163. 
226Francis Marion to John Palmer , Jr., August[?], 
1781 , Charlestown Yearbook of 1898, App. A, and John 
Rutledge to Marion, September 26 and October 5, 1781, 
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 173-175 and 178-180. 
227The duties of the Ordinaries included proving 
wills, letters of testimentary and generally run the 
civil government. In civil law the Ordinary was a judge 
with authority to act upon cases in his own right and 
not by delegation. 
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to the post of Ordinary in the civil districts of Cheraw, 
Charleston and Georgetown. 228 Rutledge wanted Marion to 
appoint men who would be located near him (Marion) for 
their own safety. 229 The brigadiers were also told to 
appoint J ustices of the Peace in every civil district.230 
The "Swamp Fox" took measures to protect the appointed 
civil servants by giving the Justices of the Peace the 
authority to call out the militia of their distr ict to 
prevent the carrying off of property or to discipline 
people interfering with the civil administration. 23 1 
Governor Rutledge was also interested in winning 
over the Loyalists in the state to the American side 
through the i ssuance of pardons . Although this was a 
civil matter he assigned the task of approving p ardons 
to the brigad iers , thereby adding to their responsibilities. 
The Gove rnor initiate d his pardon plan in September 1781 . 
He conside r e d the time ripe to iss u e the pardon proclamation 
228John Rutledge to Francis Marion , August 13, 
1781, Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 126-127. 
229John Rutledge to Francis Mar ion, September 14, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 159-160. 
230John Rutledge to Francis Mar ion, September 2, 
and October 24, 1781, Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 131 
and 196-198. The Oxford Dict ionary defined the Justice of 
Peace a s an inferior magistrate (civil officer charged 
with administration of laws and criminal jurisdiction) 
appointed to p reserve the peace in a county , town, or 
district. 
231Francis Marion to John Palmer, Jr., Esquire , 
Charleston District, August[?] , 1781 , Charleston Yearbook 
of 1898 , p . 381. 
but ·he fir~t asked the brigadiers, Sumter, Pickens, and 
Marion, their advice on the matter. The Governor's 
greatest apprehension was the effect the proclamation 
would have on the people who had been loyal patriots 
from the start. 232 
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Pardons were to be given to all people who had 
borne arms with the enemy and were still with them with 
the following exceptions: (1) Those who refused to answer 
Rutledge's two previous proclamations ; (2) Individuals 
who had earlier refused to t ake an oath of allegiance 
to America; (3) Those who signed congratulatory messages 
to Cornwallis and Clinton; (4) Men who he ld British 
commissions; (5) Individuals whose conduct was so infamous 
that they could ne ver be pardoned. All persons seeking 
pardons were to surrender themselves to a brigadier of 
militia of the state within thirty days. If their pardon 
was approved by the brigadier they were required to perform 
militia du t y for six consecutive months and subsequently 
to perform duty as all other militiame n, two months duty 
and four months at home . The family of the pardoned man 
was allowed to r e turn and reoccupy the prope rty without 
interruption. Individuals whose pardons were refused 
were assured a safe return into the British lines . This 
too was the responsibility of the brigadie rs . 233 
232John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 15, 
1781, Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. III, pp . 162-163. 
233Proc lamation-State of South Carolina, By his 
96 
In November 1781 Governor Rutledge was prepared to 
return the state to the control of the General Assembly 
and directed the brigadi ers to appoint district poll 
managers to conduct elections for a General Assembly. 
Although the position of brigadier would become more 
influential through this action it also added to their 
already great burdens. Marion's district was to send 
ten Senate members to the assembly. 23 4 The method of, 
and individuals responsible for, conducting the elections 
lends credence to later accusations that the General 
Assembly resembled a military tribunal. That accusation 
is further substantiated in the correspondence of General 
Greene to the various brigadiers. General Greene not only 
encouraged hlarion to run for the Senate, but he also tried 
to get Thomas Sumter to run for election. Greene argued 
there was no time like the present to get the people to 
raise state troops . This was a time, he said, when civil 
gratitude was warm . With the threat of eminent danger 
there would be little difficulty in getting business 
Excellency John Rutledge, Esquire, Governor and Commander-
in-Chief of the said State, Gibbes, op. cit. , Vol. III, 
pp. 175-178. Marion was required tokeep an account of 
the pardons granted and disapproved but the listing and 
accounting are unavailabl e . 
234John Rutledge to Francis Marion, November 23, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 214-215 . 
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approved which would be favorable militarily . 235 Greene 
also apologized for detaching Colonel Wade Hampton to 
Georgia during the elections. He asked Sumter to replace 
Hampton who was desirous of getting into the assembly. 23 6 
General John Barnwell of the Beaufort District wrote 
Marion that he was u s ing his influence to get "good" 
men elected to the assembly. 237 
General Marion was one of those elec t ed as a 
Senator to the General Ass embly which met between 
January 8 and February 26, 1782 at Jacksonboroug h, thirty 
five miles west of Charleston. 238 The first order of 
business for this new assembly was the elect ion of a 
governor . Rutledge was ineligible and Christophe r Gadsden, 
only recently release d from British imprisonment in 
St. Augustine , Florida, was elected. Gadsden declined 
235Nathanae l Greene to Thomas Sumter, December 12, 
1781, Draper Mss , 7VV543 - 545; Biographical •Directory of 
the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1676; and Robe rt 
Bass, Gamecock: The Life and Campa i gns of General Thomas 
Sumter (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 
pp. 213-219. Thomas Sumter did not actively seek election 
but was elected as a Senator anyway. He attended the 
General Assembly and after it was adjourned he resigned 
his position as brigadier. 
236Nathanael Greene to Thomas Sumter, December 12, 
1781, Draper Mss, 7VV543-545. 
237General John Barnwell to Francis Marion, December 12, 
1781, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III , pp . 220-221. The term 
"good" here means inen of a pro-military American inclination . 
238Draper Mss , 16VV112 (Copy of a list of the 
Jacksonborough Assembly, 1782; Lyman C. Draper found the 
original in the Rutledge Manuscripts). 
the appointment on the basis of age and poor health . 
The assembly then chose John Mathews who had been a 
membe r of the Continental Congress where he had been 
influential in Nathanael Greene's replacement of Gates 
as commander of the Southern Army . 239 Mathews had been 
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a member of the Committee at Headquarters with the mission 
of improving Congressional support of the army. 240 As a 
result of his efforts to secure log istical support for the 
army he interceded between Washing ton and Greene and the 
Continental Congress. I t was at this time that he earned 
the respect of Ge neral Washington and cul t ivated his 
(Mathews) respect for Major General Greene , at that time 
the Quartermaster General of the Continental Army . This 
mutual respect facilitated John Mathews ' efforts to write 
General Washington direct l y as the authorized representative 
of the de l egates of the three Southern States request ing 
239Moul trie , op. cit . , Vol. I I, pp. 320-321. 
240Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Congress 
(New York: The MacMillan Co . , 1941), pp. 445-470 and 
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: 
Government Printing Off ice, 1910), Vol . XVI, (1780), 
p. 362. The Committee at Headquarters was a committee 
of three , Mathews , Philip Schuyler (N . Y. ) and Nathanae l 
Peabody (N . H.) . The election of the members was conducted 
by the Congress on April 13, 1780. I n the committee's 
efforts to help the army they were rebuked by the 
Continental Congress and disbande d in late 1780. Failure 
on the part of Congress to support Greene (through the 
committee) led to his resignation as Quartermaster 
General soon after the committee's recommendations were 
rejected for supply of the army. 
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the appointment of Greene as the Southern Army Commander. 241 
Washington honored Mathews' request and recommended Greene's 
appointment to Congress which was approved and carried into 
effect officially on October 31, 1780 with Greene arriving 
in the South in December 178o . 242 
Governor Mathews was an excellent politician. A 
b iographer of General Horatio Gates stated that Mathews 
was "politically wise seven days a week. 11243 His election 
was probably a fortuna te choice for the state. There 
were some who feared the government would fail. George 
Washington Greene , grandson of Nathanael Greene , believed 
that a collision between military and civil authorities 
during 1782 was inevitable . There might have been a 
disastrous split had it not been for the mutual respect 
and friendship between Mathews and Greene . 244 The Ge neral 
241John Mathews to George Washington, October 6, 
1780 , Letters of the Members of the Continental Cong ress, 
Edmund C. Burnett (ed.) (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1931), Vol. V, p. 408. 
242George Washington to Nathanael Greene , October 14, 
1 780 and Washington to John Mathews, October 23, 1780, 
The Writings of Geor e Washington 1745-1799, John C. 
Fitzpatrick e d. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1937, Vol . 20, pp . 181- 183 and 248-249. 
243samuel White Patterson, Horatio Gates, Defender of 
American Libe rties (New York: Columbia University Press , 
1941), p . 317 . He did not however exhibit extraordinary 
political acuity in his dealings with Congress as a member 
of the Committee at Headquarters in mid-1780. At that time 
he berated, in writing , the poor efforts of the Congress 
to support the army . 
244G. W. Greene, op . cit . , Vol. III, p . 434 and 
Macmillan, op. cit . , p . 135 .--
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Assembly gave Governor Mathews the same powers it had given 
Rutledge, but since the American Army controlled most of 
the state it was not convenient for the Governor to confer 
with the Privy Council on important items. 245 
Mathews , an astute politician, required that commissions 
for all officers to be appointed must receive his approval. 
He refused to send blank commissions , thus causing the 
commanders to wonder whether he trusted them. 246 He also 
granted exemptions from militia du ty without consulting 
the militia commander involve d, a switch from the policy 
of Governor Rutledge . 247 On occasion Mathews issued 
orders of a military nature without even informing the 
commanders, upon one occasion ordering i\Iar ion to call up 
all his militia. After i\Iarion issued the order to report, 
Mathews wrote him that he had previous ly exempted four 
companies from duty . 248 Mathews' actions did not appeal 
to most military me n. Captain James Conyers, who took 
over Colonel Hezekiah Mahrun's cavalry unit, considered 
245Mountrie, op. cit., Vol . II, p . 321 and John 
Rutledge to Francis Mar ion, October 15, 1782, Gibbes, 
op . cit., Vol. II, p. 234. The Privy Council reversed 
Mathews' decision on at least one occasion when i\Iarion 
had requested authority to prosecute individuals trading 
with the British . 
246John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 10, 1782, 
Gibbes, op . cit . , Vol. II, pp. 157-158. 
247John Mathews to Francis Marion , April 15, 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. II, pp. 164-165. 
248John Mathews to Francis Marion, May 27, 1782, 
Gibbes , op . cit . , Vol . II, p . 182 . 
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Governor Mathews to be a poor governor declaring that he 
possessed no strategy or policy whatever and had no resources 
unless he had money, .. . "in short , he [ Ma thews] is poor. 11 249 
Though Governor Rutledge had declared in September 
1781 that the offer of pardon wou ld never be renewed, i n 
March 1782 Governor Mathews outlined the procedures for 
granting new pardons. Br i gadiers would not rule on all 
pardons, a s they had under Rutle dge , just part of them . 
The Governor wou ld de t ermi ne cases i nvolving those who 
came from within the enemy l ines s ince January 8, 1782 
when the General Assembly was convened . The brigadiers 
were to make determinations about those individuals who 
were applying for the f irst time but those who were 
applying for a second time were to b e referred to the 
Governor . Those indiv idual s applyi ng for pardons and 
refuse d were t o b e returned safely i nto the Britis h 
lines but i f they were ever found in the American lines 
a gai n they were to be punished as sp i es . 2 50 
The protection afforded the General Assembly to 
secure i ts meeting place at Jacksonborough was prov ide d 
by Marion's brigade . 2 51 Marion however was at t ending 
249c apta i n J ames Conyers to Francis Marion, Octobe r 9, 
1782, Gibbes , op . c i t ., Vol. II, pp . 233-234 . 
250John Mathews to Francis Marion, March 8, 1782, 
Gibbes, op . cit.; Vol. III, p . 276 . 
251Na t hanael Greene to Franc i s Mar i on , J anuary 3, 
1782, Southern History Association , Vol. XI, p. 201 . 
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the Assembly and left command in the hands of Colonel 
Peter Horry. 252 Colone l Hezekiah Maham disputed the 
appointment of Horry by Marion. Horry accused Maham of 
interfering with his efforts to command and indicated 
to Marion that the situation was serious because men were 
leaving and Maham's attitude had caused a split in the 
brigade . Horry begged Marion to reassume command because 
the British would try to exploit the strife in the ranks.253 
Marion was deeply concerned for the welfare of the 
brigade , but h e was also mindful that his presence was 
require d at the Assembly. Although h e had asked permission 
to leave the Assembly, which was disapproved, h e was also 
interested in several bills presently on the floor which 
were of dire necessity to the military. He wrote Horry 
that only thirteen senators were present, and since a 
large part of them were military his departure might 
cause many of them to l eave thereby ending the session . 254 
1782, 
pages 
252Francis Marion to Peter Horry, January 10, 
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 228-229 (see 
20-22 and54-57). 
253Peter Horry to Francis Marion, January 31, 
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 246-247. 
254Francis Marion to Peter Horry, February 3 and 10, 
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 248-249; Simms, 
op. cit., p. 295 ; and Bass, op. cit . , p. 217. Some of the 
Senators from the military were Sumter, Hugh Horry, Colonel 
Thomas Taylor and Colonel William Thompson and an even 
larger number in the House. The bills referred to included 
a n ew militia law, the raising of a Continental quota, and 
the Confiscation Act which would provide the necessary 
money for the military elements t o be successful. 
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Before the assembl y could adjourn the Brit i sh (with a force 
of two hundred cavalry, five hundred infantry and two 
a rtillery pieces) u nder Colonel Benjamin Thompson attacked 
Marion's brigade and dispersed them . 2 55 The British 
comma nder claimed that Marion 's brigade lost two or t hree 
hundred men while the Americans estimated their loss at 
but sixteen. Both estimates are hard to believe . 256 In 
any event , the loss was a s i gn ificant blow to American 
morale but it did not cause the assembly to close nor 
was it of consequence to the overall outcome of the war 
in the South . 
The General Assembly eventually passed the military 
acts that hlarion h ad considered essential , one which was 
destined to create special problems for the brigadiers . 
By means of the "Act fo r dispos ing of certain Estates and 
banishing certain p ersons there in mentioned," commonly 
known as the Confiscation Act and has been so named, the 
255G. W. Greene, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 439-441 
and Thayer, op . cit. , pp-. -403-404 . The size of the 
American force could not be ascertained, perhaps due to 
the differences between Horry and Maham . Colonel Thompson 
was to later become Count Rumford of Bavaria as a result 
o f his eminent c i vil service to England . 
2 56Maryland Gazette, May 9, 1782, Extract of letter 
from an officer in South Carol i na dated March 13, 1782. 
The Ameri can estimate appears in error , otherwise there 
would not have been any justification for the subsequent 
consolidation of the corps under Maham and Horry. I f 
the British estimate had been correct Marion ' s brigade 
would have been almost decimated and combat ineffect ive. 
This was not the case . The two estimates clearly reflect 
reporting discrepancies . 
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responsibility for executing the act fell to five com-
missioners e l ected by the General Assembly. Needless to 
say, however, enforcement duties were assigned to t h e 
brigadiers of the distr i cts invo l ved . They were to protect 
the commissioners and the estates confiscated and to assist 
them, upon request, in confiscation. This necessarily 
posed increased problems for the military commanders. 
In an effort to fac ilitate confiscation the Assembly 
appended the nam~s of two hundred thirty six individua ls 
whose property was to be conf i scated by the commiss i oners . 
The people whose estates wer e to b e taken would be banished 
from the state forever and were granted forty-five days 
to leave . If they remained longer they were to be j ai l ed 
and, if c onvi cted b y trial, executed. 257 Althoug h Marion 
had opposed the Confisc ation Act at t h e Assembly as being 
"unwise and impolitic," it being his idea that the war 
was almost over and now was a time to be forgiving, this 
did not deter him in executing the law.258 Marion expended 
a considerable amount of time and effort in carrying out 
Mathews' directive enforcing the confiscation. He received 
257south Carolina Session Laws , January 8 to 
February 26, 1782, "An Act for disposing of c e rtain Estates 
and ban ishing certain persons therein mentioned" 
(Philadelphia : 1782). 
2S8B. s. Pe rry , Gre e n eville, South Carolina, 
Enterprise and Mountaineer, September 11, 1878, in 
Draper Mss, 2UU229; and John Mathews to Francis Marion , 
March 1, 1782 , Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 259. 
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requests from individual s asking that they b e deleted from 
the confiscation list. 259 But his most time consuming 
problem was in sending men, women a nd children back to 
the British lines. 260 
Marion's desire to end bloodshed was sincere for 
he initiated act ion toward that end in his own district 
in June 1781. At that time he tried to e nter into treat i es 
wi t h Major Micajah Ganey, the Loyalist leader of his 
district. I n these efforts a nd subsequent s uccess Mar ion 
exhibited perhaps his greates t skil l s as a politic i an , 
diplomat and soldier . General Nathanael Greene complimented 
Mar i o n declaring that the abili ty to get something of t h e 
mag nitude of the treaty with Ganey wi thout bloo dshed 
reflected more honor on an officer than could ever be 
bestowed as a r esul t of the use of force. 261 
Micajah Ganey was a household word for the peop l e 
living in Marion's district, for Ganey's Loyalists h ad 
b een operating in Eastern Sou t h Carol ina even before 
Marion assumed command of his brigade. The Loyalist 
band controlled the country from the Pedee north to the 
259Robert Blair to Francis Marion , September 7, 
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . II, pp. 224- 225 . 
260Francis Marion to Peter Horry, ·March 8, 10, 12, 
a n d 20, 1782 , Gibbes, op . cit ., Vo l. III, pp. 266- 268, 
270 and 277-278 and John Mathews to Horry, June 2 , 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol . II , p. 183. 
261Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , July 9, 
1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . II, pp . 197-198 . 
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North Carolina line and from Cheraw eastward to the 
Waccamaw. They normally numbered about five hundred men. 
Their supply of arms and ammunition was initially obtained 
from the British at Georgetown. The evacuat ion of 
Georgetown by the British dealt them a severe blow but 
they continued to operate with tactics learned from Marion 
and his men. 262 Ganey's success in harassing Marion's 
forces in the district is evident in Marion's correspondence 
and through his concern for the safety of Georgetown and 
Black Mingo, the storage depot . Loyalists successfully 
tied down forces in the area and thereby prevented an 
acceptabl e turnout of the militia . 263 
It is evident that Marion, in addition to his desire 
to prevent bloodshed, was also interested in halting the 
military threat posed by the Loyalists on the Pedee . He 
succeeded in signing his first agreement with Ganey on 
June 17, 1781 which called for a cessation of hostilit i es 
for at l east three but not more than twelve months . Both 
2 62colonel Robert Grey, "Observations of the War 
in Carolina," North Carolina University Magazine, Vol. I I I, 
(Nov. 1888), Draper Mss , 17VV42-4215. 
263colone l Lamb Benton to John Mathews, August 20, 
1782, and Benton to Francis Marion, August 29, 1782, 
Gibbes, op. cit. , Vol . II, pp . 207-209 and 214-215 . When 
Marion initially took Georgetown he had no idea the town 
would be used log i stically and he employed the previous l y 
us e d procedure of destroying the enemy's defense . This 
l ater caused him to have to erect his own defensive works. 
The turnout of militia was never 100 percent but in th is 
case the Cheraw area did not come close to that figure 




sides were to have free intercourse of traffic unmoles t ed. 
In the event that a person was bothere d or his property 
taken or destroyed, the affected person could file a 
complaint. The complaint was to be heard by a court 
martial of f i ve men; t wo Loyalists, two Americans and an 
officer commanding the unit of which the complainant was 
a member. Plunder was to be restored. The wording of 
the ag r eemen t was more of an un ders tanding t han a treaty 
and reflected that neither party was strong enou gh to 
defeat the other. 2 64 
The a greement of June 1781 l asted for only the 
minimal term of three months . 265 Not until June of 1782 
was an y positive a ction taken by Marion . At that time 
North Carolina's Governor, Alexande r Martin, wrote Marion 
that h e had ordered 250 men to move toward South Carolina 
to assist i n the effort to put a stop to Ganey and his 
men who were harboring notorious North Carolinians. 
News of the a ctions of the Governor of North Carolina 
d id not arrive until after the treaty was signed. 266 
264Artic l es of Agreement made and concluded between 
Colonel Peter Horry, in behalf of General Marion, and 
Major Ganey , Commanding officer of the Loyalists or 
King's s ubj ects , i nhabitants l ying between Great Pee 
Dee [sic] River and North Carolina. Gibbes , ~ · cit., 
Vol. III, p. 98 . 
265Major John J ames to Francis Mar i on , September 20, 
1781, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, pp . 170-171. 
266Extract of l etter, Governor Thomas Burke 
. (predecessor to Alexander Martin as governor of North 
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Marion had received guidance from his Governor, 
John Mathews, concerning the truce negotiations and he 
(Marion) sent Colonel Peter Horry, Colone l Baxter and 
Major John James to confer with Ganey on terms for a new 
treaty. 267 Their efforts were successful and Marion and 
Ganey signed the treaty on June 8, 1782 . An effective 
i tem in negotiating the treaty was a letter by General 
Leslie (British) to General Nathanael Gree ne. The letter 
containe d Sir Hepry Clinton's comments concerning the 
possibility of a suspension of hostilities in the North 
and his hopes for the same in the Sou t h . For Loyalists 
this pose d a morale problem . 268 Ganey ' s men were to lay 
down their arms and not to resume hostilities until cal led 
in support of South Carolina a ga inst t he British. They 
were required to return all property taken from any 
Americans . Any of the Loyalists who refused the t erms 
of the t reaty were to b e turned over to the Americans 
who would exchange them for American prisoners. 269 
Carolina) to John Rutle dge , March 6, 1782, (initial com-
plaint of North Carolina a gainst Ganey) and Peter Horry to 
Francis Marion , January 31, 1782, Gibbes , op . cit . , Vol. II I , 
pp . 246-247 and 265-266; and Governor Alexander Martin to 
Francis 1larion, June 8, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, 
pp . 185-186 . - . 
267John Mathews to Francis Marion, May 21, 1782 
and Marion to Major Ganey , June 2, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit . , 
Vol. II, pp. 183-186. 
268General Alexander Leslie to Nathanael Greene , 
May 23, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . II , p. 179 . 
269Tr~aty between General Francis Marion in behalf 
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Governor Mathews extended to General Marion the 
thanks and ~oncurrence of all members of the Privy Counci l 
on the treaty. The Governor believed the results of such 
a treaty without bloodshed woul d be even greater when 
final peace was realizect. 270 There still remained however 
the matter of rounding up and ha ndling the Loyalists who 
refused t h e treaty terms . 271 The maj ority of Ganey's men 
(the largest est imate of Ganey's force has been placed at 
about five hundred) joined Marion's brigade . They fought 
on Marion ' s side in his last eng a gement against the British 
under Colonel Frazier in the l atter part of August 1782. 
They proved to b e some of the best fighters in the brigade . 
They surely unde rstood that i f they were taken b y the 
British their penalty would be de ath . 272 
of the State of South Carolina , and Major Micaj ah Ganey 
and the inhabitants under his command which were included 
in the treaty made the 17th of June , 1781 with Major Ganey, 
Gibbes , op . cit ., Vol. III, p. 98. 
270John Mathews t o Francis Marion, June 1 5 , 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit ., Vol. II , pp . 190-191. 
271Francis Mar i on t o Peter Horry , June 9, 1782, 
Gibbes , op. cit ., Vol . II, pp . 187-188. One body numbering 
at l eastthirty men under Colone l Fanning were i n this 
category . 
272Thayer , o~ . ~-i t . , pp. 403-404 and Simms, EE· c it . , 
p. 320. It i s very doubtful that the number who fought with 
Marion ever totaled 500 men but there is no definite or 
estimate d number . 
~ ONCLUSION 
Contrary to popular belief, Francis Marion was not 
the dominant military figure in South Carolina during the 
Revolutionary War . He placed a distant second to Major 
General Nathanael Greene in both accomplishments and the 
eyes of contemporary South Carolinians. The decision of 
the people was evidenced by the General Assembly of 
South Carolina on February 26, 1782. At that time the 
Assembly passe d a bill entitled, "An Act to empower 
Thomas Ferguson, Morton Wilkinson , and John Ward, Esquires, 
to purchase an Estate of the value of Ten Thousand Guineas 
[about $50,000] in Trust, and for the use of the Honorable 
Major General Nathanael Greene . " At the same time the 
Assembly voted to award Marion a gold medal for his 
services . 
Marion's biographers wou ld hav e the reader believe 
that he was a magnetic and natural leader . This was not 
always the case (i . e. Colonel Hezekiah Maham), though he 
(Marion) was evidently an excellent l eader . He also 
needed authority and had to use it to maintain discipline. 
General Hamilton H. Howze, commander of United Nations 
forces in Korea 1962 through 1964, said that the man who 
claims that he can, simply by exercising his magnetic 
personal ity, persuade another man to attempt something 
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very like ly to kill him is a "monumental idiot. 11273 Marion 
needed the authority given by the South Carolina General 
Assembly and the directives of the Governors to make his 
forces r eport for duty and do their duty once they reported . 
Marion was also known to place men in j ail who had violated 
l aws . 
It appears that Marion ' s initial reasons for 
assumption of command have been g lamorized to the point 
of discredit of Gene r al Horatio Gates. General Gates 
h ad been accus e d of sending l\Iarion to command the 
Williamsburg militia because the bizarre appearance of 
Marion and his men was distracting to the regular soldiers 
under Gates . Why he sent Marion away and attached a 
portion of his own force (about four hundred men) to 
General Thomas Sumter has never been answered . Gates , 
whose greatest shortcoming was impatience, fai l ed to 
r ecord his innermost thou ghts or strategy. That omission 
l eft him ope n to future assumptions and presumptions. 
Francis l\Iarion's actions after tak ing over the Williamsburg 
militia indicate that he receive d a similar miss ion from 
Gates as he did later from Gree ne . 
Marion was to obtain intelligence , harass the enemy 
and cut their suppl y lines . I t was as a guerrilla leader 
that Marion's fame was primarily extolled. Ironically , he 
273Hamilton H. Howze, "Military Discipline and 
National Security," Army Magazine, Vol. 21, No . 1 
(January, 1971), p . 14. 
only served as a true gu errill a leader for nine and one 
half months , August 10, 1780 through May 28, 1780 when 
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he took ove:· Georgetown. Even when he participated in 
significant major battles, such as Eutaw Springs, Marion's 
force served as reinforcements to the nucleus of Generals 
Gree n e and Sumter. His force size f l uctuated too much to 
be counted on as a major force i n decisive e ngagements . 
Nathanael Greene was quick to point out the ins i gnificance 
of a force like Marion's . He said that the small parties 
o f guerri ll as were he lpful but of no consequence in the 
great even ts of the war . 
However , it was outside the purely mil i tary realm 
where Mar i on made his most significant contributions . 
His continued presence i n Eastern South Carolina maintained 
the morale of the Americans in that area. Marion's s u ccess 
in establishing a truce with the Loyalists in his district 
exhibited his diplomacy and desire to terminate hostilities . 
Bu t Marion ' s greatest contribution to the Sou thern Campaign 
in the Revolutionary War was throu gh l ogistics . He was the 
primary s upplier of sal t for the Sou thern Army and maintained 
a supply depot for that necessary commodity at Black Mingo . 
Further, his control of Georgetown and its port facility 
provided Ge neral Greene with a more extensive logistical 
base than h e had ever before experi enced in the Southern 
Theater . The rivers radiat ing out of Georgetown into the 
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interior portions of South Carolina also provided Greene 
with an increased line of communication and control. 
After the war Marion moved to his plantation in 
St. John's to rebuild his estate . He married a wealthy 
spinster , Mary Esther Videau in 1786 . This was Marion's 
first and only marriage . There were no children by this 
union . In 1784 Marion was g iven command of Fort Johnson 
in Charleston Harbor with a salary of 500 pounds per year. 
Upon his marriage that salary was reduced to five shillings 
per day . The post and his position were discont inued in 
1790 . Francis Marion lived out his days on his plantation 
and died there on February 27, 1795. He was buried at 
Be lle Isle, South Carolina. 
.. 
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FRANCIS MARION, 1780-1782 
Rayburn C. Stovall, M. A. 
Morehead State University, 1971 
Thesis Abstract 
Director of Thesis: Mr. Stuart Sprague 
Francis Marion, alias the "Swamp Fox," has been 
eulogized to the point of fantasy. He has been elevated 
to a pedestal by writers rang ing from the itinerant 
preacher , Mason -Locke Weems, to the c~rtoonist, Walt 
Disney. The praise and acclaim accorded Marion was 
based primarily on his accomplishments as a guerrilla 
leader in Eastern South Carolina during the Revolutionary 
War. Ironically, he only served as a guerrilla for ten 
months, August 10, 1780 to May 28, 1781. 
Prior to this time he had served in conventional 
roles in the Continental servi ce, beginning in June 1775 
as a Captain in the Second South Carolina Regiment. He 
later commanded that regiment (September 1776 to April 1780) 
as a Lieutenant Colonel. It was not until August 1780 
that he first employed guerril la tactics, many of which 
he had observed first hand in the Indian Wars of 1759 and 
1761. Although he was successful in his utilization of 
such tactics against the Brit ish, he was thrus t back into 
a more conventional rol e when he occupie d Georgetown, 
2 
South Carolina in May 1781. With the acquisition of 
Georgetown, his whereabouts were no longer clothed in 
the secrecy of the guerrilla, reacting openly to all 
attempts or threats of such against Georgetown. 
It was control of Georgetown that led to one of his 
two major roles in the Revolutionary War. As the militia 
commander in charge of the district of which Georgetown 
was a part, he became deeply involved in the trade in 
that port city. He established prices, controlled trade 
and became the principal supplier of salt, a vital 
necessity in the South Carolina climate , for the Southern 
Theater. The importance of the port facility nece ssitated 
Marion's change to a defensive posture . Thus he became 
a vital part of the log istical operations in the South . 
His second major contribution in this theater during 
the critical years , 1780-1782, was his ability to maintain 
the morale of the Americans of Eastern South Carolina 
Most of his military efforts were directed toward that 
goal as it assured him of a militia force . He was an 
excellent leader or he would not have been able to retain 
the confidence of the people. But, contrary to the verbal 
picture painted by some authors, he was a stern disci-
plinarian. Marion was capable of severely punishing 
people for v i o lations against the American cause. Several 
of the leadership problems in his brigade were actually 
initiated, inadvertently of course, by General Nathanael 
Gree·ne, such as the case of the independent corps of 
Lieutenant Colonels Peter Horry and Hezekiah Maham. 
Marion had other responsibilities which minimized 
his ability to perform in a strictly military role. 
As a militia brigadier responsible for about one-third 
of the state, he performed political functions ranging 
from the conduct of elections to appointment of Justices 
of the Peace. He was also charged with the overall 
responsibility of l aw and order in his district and the 
granting of parole pardons to former Loyalists . Marion 
was elected and attended a forty eigh~ day session of 
the South Carolina General Assembly in 1782 which took 
3 
him away from military operations. Thus the responsi-
bilities of an effective brigadier covered a broad 
spectrum and left very little time for military operations. 
Marion's overall importance in the Southern 
Theater, though considerable, must be considered in the 
proper perspective. General Nathanael Greene was the 
first to reflect on the importance of an element such 
as Marion's force . Greene said that though a group such 
as Marion's brigade was important, it was of no consequence 
in the great events of war. A more materialistic impression 
of Marion's value , in comparison with General Greene, 
the Southern Army Commander , was evidenced by the South 
Carolina General ·Assembly in February 1782. That body 
voted to a ward an estate of a value of $50 ,000 (10,000 
guineas) to General Greene for his services to the state. 
At the same meeting that body voted Francis Marion a 
gold medal for his services. 
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